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<f bitorial 
This edition of the Mana~ement Quarterli, is a 
continuation of a student proJect initiated in the Fourth 
Quarter, 1968-1969 Academic Year. 
In selecting material for each edition of the Manage-
ment Quarterly, the editorial staff solicits various 
professors in the Operations Research and Administrative 
Sciences curricula for student academic efforts that, in 
their opinion, display excellence in terms of originality, 
literary ability, and well documented research. Therefore, 
it is quite reasonable to expect a very broad scope of 
potential material to be considered and in fact, there is 
consistently a wealth of student papers which must be re-
viewed, screened and selected for publication each quarter. 
Prior to selecting any student papers for publication 
in this issue, we, the editors endeavored to "define" who 
the typical reader of the Management Quarterly is and what 
criteria we should use to select articles for him to read. 
In our opinion, the typical reader is a busy student, who 
has little time for reading outside his studies and who will 
reject any extracurricular articles he considers too "dry 
and stuffy. 11 Therefore, in order to meet his needs and the 
objectives of the Mana~ement Quarterly we used the following 
criteria in our selection of student papers for publication. 
First, they had to be easy to read. We felt the reader 
should be able to read t he ar t icle without spending a great 
deal of time or effort at it. 
Second, the papers had to be timely and interesting. We 
recognized that this was a formidable requirement because of 
the large n wnber of readers with extremely diverse interests 
and backgrounds. 
0 
Third, the papers must inform the reader, adding to his 
professional knowledge and managerial ability. They should O 
be challenging and thought provoking, providing the reader 0 
with new ideas and alternative so l utions to professional and 
managerial problems. 
Using these criteria we have f o rmulated t his edition 
from a large number of papers dealing with many subject areas. 
We feel the papers of this issue are readable, interesting, 
and informative and we hope that you agree. 
The views expressed in the papers selected for publica-
tion in this edition of the Management Quarterly are those 
of the authors exclusively and in no way reflect the attitude 
or endorsement of the Defense Department, Navy Department, 






Naval Air Systems Command: 
Program Management 
By F.D. Schwikert 
Recently a great deal of attention has 
been focused upon program management. 
It has been touted as the solution to 
the successfu l development of complex 
weapons systems. This paper gives 
the reader an introduction into the 
organizational concepts of program 
management as exercised in the Naval 
Systems Command. 
This paper was submitted to Commander 
Benedicktsson for Behavioral Science 
in Management (os•J50l) 
Introduction: 
Birth of Program Management 
Technological advances during the past decade have pro-
gressed at an accelerated rate. 
"Considering that the annual national 
R&D budget in the United States is 
larger than the total budget used to 
run medium-sized nations, it is no 
exageration that R&D is an ernrnense 
apparatus ••• Of every eight 
scientists who ever lived seven are 
alive today." ( 5: 9) 
As science continues to progress, the effects of increased 
technology will continue to complicate the weapons systems 
of the Navy. State-of-the-art development of a weapon 
system leads to quicker obsolescence of existing systems. 
Lieutenant F.D. Schwikert, U.S. Navy, received his B.S. degree 
from Georgia Tech in Z96?, and received his M.S. degree in 
Aeronautical Engineering from the Naval Postgraduate School 
in l9'15. 
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"The rapid advancing t echnology has 0 
taxed man's organizational and 
administrative abilities . As major 
scientific projects become more 
complex, the problems of management 
increase greatly." (7:134) 
It is the complexity of today's weapons systems that has o · 
lead to the development of a dynamic new form of management. 
"The development and p r oduction of 
a major defense system shall be 
manned by a single individual 
(program man ager) who shall have 
a charter which provides suffi-
cient authority to accomplish re-
cognized program objectives." (4:1) 
This policy set forth by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 
the Honorable David Packard, is the origin of program 
management in the Department of Defense. In response to 
this policy, the Naval Air Systems Command has set up 
program management offices to man age its major weapon 
systems. 
NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND ORGANIZATION: 
Functional Support 
Organization by function is based on specialization 
and division of labor. It is the most common organization 
form. A function is an action or activity which supports 
or is a part of a larger organization. The Naval Air Systems 
Command is made up of six such functional departments. Each 
department is sub - divided into divisions and further into 
branches. 
These functional groups are much like those conceived 
by Max Weber, the German sociologist, who studied organi-
zations in the early part of the twentieth century. He felt 
that man was the unpredictable element in an organization. 
To minimize his impact on the organization a well-defined 
hierarchy of authority must be established. To capitalize 
on specialized skills Weber also advocated division of labor 
based upon functional specialization. (7:58-9) These 
features are incorporated into the Naval Air Systems Command 








based upon their functional skills and well-defined chains 
of command are maintained. 
Air 5332 is responsible solely for development, test, 
evaluation and production engineering of air-launched 
missile internal guidance, control and electrical power 
supply sub-systems, internal telemetry and intercept 
instrumentation, guidance-activated fuzing sub-systems 
and associated test equipment therefor. This highly 
specialized function is their sole area of responsibility. 
The same degree of specialization is essentially true for 
the other branches. (9:533) 
Purely functional organizations provide flexibility 
and versatility in the utilization of manpower. Personnel 
can be used on many different projects. By grouping 
specialists in this fashion, knowledge and experience 
attained from one project can yield benefits to others. 
Basically, it can be stated that through functional organ-
ization, the Naval Air Systems Command has maintained a 
broad manpower base which exhibits continuity from one 
project to another. Thus, as the Missile Guidance and 
Control Branch transitions from project to project a 
greater degree of knowledge and experience of missile 
guidance and control is attained. 
Program Management 
Although the functional approach to management provides 
for flexible use of manpower, the Department of Defense 
recognized a major disadvantage of functional organizations 
operating alone. (6:8) It does not provide the program 
oriented emphasis necessary to the accomplishment of today's 
complex projects. No one individual is responsible for the 
total project. 
"In bureaucratic organizations people 
tend to become self-centered avoiding 
responsibility wherever possible. They 
find it easier to fall in line with 
easy-to-understand rules instead of 
being inspired by the larger objectives 
of the organization." (1:17) 
There also exists a tendency for functional managers 
to set standards of performance. These standards · are often 
used solely to perpetuate the existance of the organization. 
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11The function form has important 
advantages, but som e act u al imple-
mentations become limiting. Too 
narrow a functional outlook tends 
to create little empires within the 
organization. Overall objectives 
become obscured, and defense 
mechanisms develop to promote a 
particular function into an inde-
pendent entity instead of part of 
the entire process. " ( 8 : 5 3) 
These problems associated with functional specialists are 
not new. 
"The expert, in fact, simply by 
reason of his immersion in a routine, 
tends to lack flexibility of mind 
once he approaches th e margins of 
his special theme. He is incapable 
of rapid adaptation to novel situa-
tions. He unduly discounts experience 
which does not tally with his own. 
He is hostile to views which are not 
set out in terms he has been accustomed 
to handle. No man is so adept at 
realizing difficulties within the 
field that he knows; but also, few are 
so incapable of meeting situations 
outside that field. Specialism seems 
to breed a horror of unwonted experi-
ment, a weakness in achieving adapta-
bility, both of which make the expert of 
dubious value when he is in sup r eme 
command of a situation." (12:92) 
Another problem associated with functional specialists is 
0 
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the tendency to see their discipline as the focal point of O 
program success. In order to reconcile these problems, O 
program management was introduced into the Naval Air Systems 
Command. The concept of program management is to develop, 
in a single individual, sole line authority and responsibility 
for the accomplishment of the specified program objectives. 
The program manager must then direct the development of 
systems in such a manner as to meet the performance, cost and 
sched u le objectives which are defined by his service. In 
essence, the program manager is required to draw the author-
ity and responsibility of the parent Service for the 






attention on the accomplishment of his program objectives, 
he becomes the major force drawing the program towards 
successful completion. 
"Recently, a panel of military 
program managers examining their 
role likened it to that of the 
general manager of a small company. 
The comparison is especially apt. 
It would be impossible to write 
a meaningful position description 
for that job. It is equally im-
possible to write one for the 
program manager's job. What the 
general manager does is whatever 
is needed to move the affairs of 
the business. He does one thing 
at one time and another thing at 
another time -- whatever is most 
needed at the moment to achieve 
his objectives. A general manager 
is not a doer of any job -- there 
are other managers charged with 
the doing. But the general 
manager sees to it that what he 
wants done, and his objectives 
are achieved. The role implies 
reliance on others to do the work; 
but it also implies controlling 
and coordinating the work so that 
no one aspect dominates others to 
the detriment of the harmony of 
the whole. " ( 6 : 4) 
Here we see the basic framework of organization in the 
Naval Air Systems Command. The Assistant commands are the 
"doers" and the program offices act as the general managers 
who are tasked with the harmony of the whole. 
Criteria for Program Management 
It would be impractical to assume that the concept of 
program management could be applied to all programs. The 
benefits derived from program management must be weighed 
against the extra cost and manpower involved in the install-
ation of a program office. Consequently, the Department of 
Defense has established three basic criteria for the 
establishment of program management. 
s 
l. High dollar value (programs which have estimated 
research and development, testing and engineering costs in O 
excess of fifty million dollar s, or an estimated production 
cost in excess of two hundred mi l lion dollars). 
2. National urgency. 
3. Recommendations by Department of Defense Component 
Heads or Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Officials. 
0
. 
In addition, program manage ment can be established for pro-
grams that involved a high degree of organizational complex-
ity or technical involvement. (4:1) 
NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT: 
Program Office 
Naval Air Systems Command program of f ices are typically 
small centralized management groups. They are served by the 
functional groups which are re s ponsible to the program office 
for the execution of assigned tasks. This environment, where 
resources for mission accomplishment are located exterior to 
the managing authority, could be a source of conflict. Again, 
functional specialists tend to se e their area of concern as 
paramount to the success of the program. In order to 
eliminate this tendency, program offices in the Naval Air 
Systems Command are given specific charters under which to 
operate. The program charter bestows the authority upon the 
program manager to accomplish the objectives of his charter. 
In order to understand the need for authority, it is 
necessary to examine the responsibilities of a program 
manager. 
"The program manager is involved in the 
definition, development, testing and 
evaluation, acquisition and initial 
support of the system in response to 
operational requirements. This includes 
various sub-systems and components, 
spare and repair parts, pe culi a r 
ground support and test equipmen t , train-
ing equipment and all supporting technical 
documentation." (10:2) 
To adequately direct an effort of this magnitude, a program 
manager must be established early in the development cycle. 
However, early establishment is not the sole requirement. 








manager's involvement must begin early in the development 
cycle and last through initial introduction to the fleet. 
In order that a program manager can effectively 
direct a responsibility of this magnitude, a great deal of 
authority must be delegated to him. The vehicle of this 
authority is the program manager's charter. 
Executive Authorities of a Project Manager 
1. The authority to make the necessary 
technical and business management decisions on all matters 
within the scope of their Project charters, other than 
those business decisions for which the Contracting Officer 
is responsible under ASPR and Departmental procedures. 
2. The authority to exercise control over all 
resources approved in the Five Year Defense Plan and 
authorized for obligation in allocations. 
3. The authority to establish work tasks, 
establish schedules for work accomplishment, approve cost 
estimates and Procurement Requests. 
4. The authority to issue under the Project 
M~nager's own signature such correspondence, technical 
directives, planning directives, management plans, instruc-
tions and allocations as may be necessary to ensure that 
his Project is properly managed. 
5. The authority to establish direct communi-
cation channels with participants in his Project. 
6. The authority to plan, organize and adminis-
ter his immediate Project Management Office. 
7. The authority to prepare and sign efficiency 
reports on civilian personnel assigned to his immediate 
Project Management Office. 
8. The authority to prepare and sign fitness 
reports of military personnel assigned to his immediate 
Project Management Office. 
9. The authority to appeal any decision of a 
Data Review Board or an Engineering Change control Board 
to his Chartering Authority. 
10. The authority to appeal any decision by a 
Contracting Officer to his Chartering Authority. (11:6) 
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Although the program managers typically are lower in 
rank than the Assistant Commanders of the Naval Air system 
Command, they enjoy a direct command line to the Commander. 
Consequent l y the authority of a program manager is commen-
surate with the responsibility associated in the management 
of the program. Although the Naval Air Systems Command 
program manager's charter is well defined, and his 
authority clear cut, his utilization of the concepts of 
program management is by no means routine. 
"Military program managers should be 
free to exercise judgement .•. He must 
decide for himself what methods, 
techniques and systems he will use." 
(6: 6) 
u se of Program Management 
I n troducing the concept of program management, the 
Naval Air Systems Command has attained the means to manage 
the development of its complex weapon systems. To see how 
program management is applied, it is necessary to examine 
a typical program office and describe its relation to the 
rest of the command. 
When a requirement for a weapon system is established 
that meets the necessary thresholds of cost, urgency or 
complexity, the commander issues a 5400 series instruction. 
This instruction established a program under the direction 
of the Commander Naval Air Systems Command. It assigns 
the program manager by name and promulgates his charter. 
This charter provides the program scope, operating rela-
tionships, organizations and resources, and deligates the 
authority and responsibility of the program manager. 
Normally background information leading to the establishment 




Once the charter is issued and the program office 0 
staffed, it is the responsibility of the program manager to 
execute the "cradle-to-grave" objectives of the charter. 
A typical program office will be staffed with less than ten 
people. With this small allocation of manpower, the 
dependence upon functional groups can readily be seen. The 
program manager must accomplish his defined goals through 
the use of personnel in the functional structure of the 
Assistant Commanders. He draws up the specialized skills 
of particular functional branches as required. For example, 
a program office may be responsible for the procurement of 






weapon system could be a sophisticated radar. The require-
ment for the development of the radar system would be 
delegated to a functional group. In this case, Air-5333, 
the Radar and Tactical Control Branch. The program office 
would set the requirements for the radar system to assure 
compatibility with the entire system, but the radar branch 
would actually develop the system. 
In this manner the program manager reaches out cutting 
across functional lines for the accomplishment of his 
specific objectives. This type of management has the 
advantage of horizontal and diagonal relationships. In such 
an organization, managers and technicians deal horizontally 
with peers. To follow the chain of command would be un-
wieldy, time consuming and costly, and would disrupt and 
delay work. 
Another, and perhaps the greatest, advantage associated 
with this type of management is its ability to view a 
program through a systems approach. Again let us refer to 
the development of a weapon system which requires a radar 
system. By tasking a program manager with the responsibility 
of the development of a weapon system, there is assurance 
that the radar system will be compatible with the rest of 
the weapon system. Because of their high degree of special-
ization, the Radar Branch working independently may not be 
able to achieve syEtem compatibility. 
On the other hand, the necessity to work through 
functional groups provides the checks and balances required 
to develop weapon systems. 
"The project manager does not have 
unilateral authority in the project 
effort; he frequently negotiates with 
the functional manager. These 
negotiations provide an opportunity 
to achieve trade-offs between project 
performance, delivery, and cost 
objectives." (2 :230) 
It is through this use of program management that the 
Naval Air Systems Command is able to successfully manage 
complex weapon systems. 
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THE FUTURE OF PROGRAM MANAGEMENT: 
Criticism of Program Management 
Since its inception, program management has fallen 
prey to severe criticism. Much of this criticism is 
from the functional managers who feel the program managers 
are usurping funct i onal authority. This attitude stems 
from a lack of understanding of the concept of program 
management. 
"One major di f ficulty on managerial 
personnel in adjusting to the con-
cept of project management is their 
failure to understand its derivation. 11 
( 3: 2) 
As time progresses and functional managers learn that 
program management is not a threat to their existence, then 
the interface between program manager and functional manager 
will become more harmonious. 
Another criticism raised by functional managers concerns 
the application of manpower resources. As more and more 
programs are established, more requirements are passed on 
to the functional managers. The functional groups, however, 
usually operate at fixed personnel levels. This means that 
programs begin to compete for the best personnel in the 
functional groups. The solution to this problem, while very 
apparent, is not readily attainable. As development and 
manpower costs continue to rise, operating budgets do not. 
Given a fixed amount of personnel, the more programs they 
are required to participate in, the less time they can spend 
on any one program. Although not desirable, this situation 
is sometimes necessary. 
Key to Success 
The final point to be raised in the future of program 
management concerns the program manager himself. If we 
expect the development of highly sophisticated weapon 
systems to be successful, then we must insure that the 
main ingredient to this success is present. It is not enough 
to merely appoint a program manager. 
"An individual placed in the position 
of a project manager will find little 











Only by establishing high quality standards and providing 
adequate training for program managers can we expect 
program management to continue to be the effective tool 
it is in the development of complex weapon systems. 
ll 
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The Merchant Marine Impact On· Economic 
And National Security 
By Vernon D. St ocker 
The U.S. flag merchant marin e industry 
has been a victim of Zack of foresight, 
inflation, and crisis managem~nt. U.S. 
trade is predominantLy in the hands of 
foreign carriers. This paper discusses 
the current state of the U.S. flag 
merchant marine fleet and its im p act on 
U.S. economic and national s e curity. 
This paper ~as submitted to Commander 
Benediktsson for Transportation Manage-
ment (MN 3373), 
Problem; U.S. trade is predominatly in the hands of foreign 
carriers, posing a threat to both economic and governmental 
controls: 
In 1946, the United States flag merchant fleet was the 
largest and finest in the world. Now it is seventh in rank-
ing, far from the newest of fleets, and committed to carrying 
only five percent of total U.S. cargo tonnage. Bulk vessels 
carry an even smaller two percent of the cargo available to 
their class. U.S. liner cargoes, despite operating subsidies 
from the federal government, exhibit a similar, steadily 
deteriorating state of affairs.l 
1Hall, P. , "A Union Leader Looks at the Merchant Marine, 11 
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1974, p. 182. 
Lieutenant Commander Vernon D. Stocker, U.S. Navy, received 
his B.A. degree from the University of California, Berkeley, 
in Z983. He is presently a candidate for the M.S. degree in 
Management at the NavaZ Postgraduate School . 
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It has been said that international sea commerce is a 
zero-sum game in many respects. There is a given amount of 
ocean freight to be hauled over the earth's surface. A 0 
number of nations which serve as suppliers for U.S. critical 
materials recognize the value of leverage in obtaining a 
share of the essen .tial seaborne trade, particularly for their 
indigenous exports. The trend of late has witnessed signif-
icant efforts by Middle Eastern and South American oil 
producing nations to mandate all export cargo for their own 
0
. 
up-and-coming fleets of flag ships. Iraq, Egypt, Libya, and 
Syria have announced plans for significant new tanker con-
struction projects. The more important oil exporters from 
our point of view - 2 Venezuela, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia --have similar goals. 
In June, 1969, a Soviet cargo ship entered the port of 
Seattle carrying 900 tons of titanium -- an essential metal 
for aircraft production. Eighteen months later, another 
Soviet freighter docked in Los Angeles with a load of steel 
and general cargo from Japan. The Far Eastern Steamship 
Company (FESCO), a Soviet government-owned corporation 
operating out of Vladivostok, thus commenced penetration of 
U.S. trade by providing "third flag" service to our Pacific 
Coast ports. 136,000 tons moved in this manner from Japan 
during 1970, and an additional 87,000 tons during the first 
six months of 1971. The first of three vessels in FESCO's 
new full container service departed Long Beach in September 
1972 with an enroute stop in Oakland and final destination 
Hong Kong. 3 
Western world shippers express increasing concern that 
a continued Soviet gain in merchant marine trade will drive 
private shipowners (and marginal operators) out of business, 
unless further government subsidies and other forms of 
assistance are rapidly forthcoming. The facts are these: 
the Soviet's massive shipbuilding program enabled their 
merchant marine fleet to surpass the u.s. fleet in tonnage 
in 1973, coincidentally doubling our statistics in numbers 
of ships as well. The Soviet merchant fleet also carries 0 
roughly 50 percent of that nation's own cargoes at the O 
present time -- a firmly established tradition for many 
major maritime nations. Current projections indicate that 
2 Ibid. , p. 1 Bl. 






despite the impetus provided by our Merchant ~arine Act 
of 1970, the USSR will have 23 million deadweight tons of 
available shipping in comparison to an anticipated 15.5 
million deadweight tons for the U.S. in the year 1980.4 
In addition to our chief rival for control of the 
oceans commercially and militarily, we are also outweighed 
by the private flag-of-convenience fleets of Liberia, 
Norway, Britain and Japan. Other countries such as Greece 
are vying for elevated rank in the shipping circle. Let us 
couple this thought with the noteworthy fact that U.S. 
dependence on foreign raw materials has grown dramatically 
in the last decade. The following tables is a list of 
essential raw material imports for which we presently have 



























We also depend on foreign processing services for refining 
oil and liquifying gas. Furthermore, some U.S. based 11multi-
national" corporations, such as in the electronics industry, 
have moved their manufacturing enterprises abroad, subsequent-
ly exporting back to the continental U.S. its essential but 
sophisticated equipments for both the civilian and military 
sectors. 
4 Loe. cit. 
5 . 
Hall, op. cit., p. 181. 
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A collateral but very closely related issue is the 
concept of an "effective U.S. control" (EUSC) fleet during 
times of national emergency. The peacetime or cold war 
trade environment points to an already scarce supply of U.S. 
shipping bottoms for our own imports/exports. The EUSC 
doctrine of control is based upon contracts or agreements 
between the federal government and owners of flags-of-conven-
ience vessels. When national security is at stake, in terms 
of an emergency proclaimed by the President, an unmodified 
section of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 gives the 
government the authority to requisition or purchase any 
vessels owned by citizens of the United States, regardless 
of f lag registry. Typically, such ships fly the flags of 
Panama, Liberia, and less frequently, Honduras ( t:he so-called 
PanHonLib flags) . Foreign citizens also operate some of the 
ships in the EUSC fleet. 
The Maritime Admi nistration carries out the effective 
control principle through one or a combination of four types 
of agreernents6 wi th ship operators: 
1 . Contracts derived from the trade-out-and-build 
program, where the United States permitted the sale or 
transfer of certain flag vessels in 1956 to foreign registry 
provided that new ships would be built in American yards to 
replace transferred ones and that all such vessels would be 
sub j ect to the emergency requisition procedures of the 1936 
Merchant Marine Act. 
2. Direct or i n direct U.S. citizen ownership, in 
which we reserve the right to acquire privately-owned prop-
erty in the interests of national defense. This means that 
the Republics of Liberia and Panama would be expected to 
acquiesce in the face of a specific takeover of their flag 
fleets, solely to oblige the effective contro l concept. 
3. War risk insurance, or interim insurance policies 
provided by the federal gove rnm e n t to cover shipowners for 
a 30-day period after the outbreak of a war involving the 
0 
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major world powers. Since most commercial insurance po l icies O 
would be void in an international conflict , the war risk O 
insurance program has successfully attracted many shipowners 
willing to make their vessels available to the U.S . governme nt 
in retur n for financia l sec uri t y in a critical period. 
6Emery, S .w. , "U.S. Effective Control Fleet," U .s. 




4. Letters of intent, considered the least reliable 
of the four agreements, are written statements to the Maritime 
Administration from commercial operators and owners that 
their ships will be placed under U.S. disposition in an 
emergency. Such representations come about through the 
unilateral good faith of the signers, and nothing more. 
The presumption that EUSC ships will be available in a 
crisis is a major U.S. mobilization planning factor. The 
strategy of EUSC places tremendous confidence in agreements 
which are of less than treaty significance, and with the 
exception of war risk insurance, there is an abiding trust 
in shipowners/operators acting in consonance with U.S. aims 
vice commercial interests or the desires of the countries 
of registry. 
Since EUSC is an untested concept, objections 7 to the 
program are many and diffuse: indisputable control of 
foreign-registered and foreign-manned ships cannot be assured 
( as already mentioned); the "balance" of the EUSC fleet, with 
a great many large and specialized oil and bulk carriers, 
does not include a sufficient inventory of "clean" tankers 
to carry exotic aviation and ship fuels used by the U.S. 
military; foreign-built ships lack many national defense 
features incorporated in U.S. built ships (items 100% funded 
by MARAD at the time of construction, I might add); foreign 
crews might be unwilling to man EUSC ships during wartime 
operations; and finally, the disruption of EUSC fleet foreign 
trade patterns might cause devastating economic and political 
repercussions for both allied and neutral nations. 
To gain an approximate idea of U.S. flag fleet (privately-
owned) and EUSC fleet compositions, the reader is invited to 
examine Appendix One.a 
In summary, the United States finds no economic or 
national security in its present flag merchant shipping. The 
image of the merchant marine as a small but competent peace-
0 time industry with the capability of rapid expansion in an 
0 emergency is an outmoded concept. We have only recently 
embarked on a new shipbuilding program to satisfy domestic 
goals. Future military conflicts will most certainly depend 
on an off-the-shelf merchant marine •..• not on a head-long 
7Kasputys, J.W. and J.B. Young, "Subsidies, Seed Money, 
and National Security," Sea Power, September 1974, p. 29. 
8 
Erne ry , .e.2_. cit • , p • 16 7 • 
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revitalization of the shipbuilding industry such as that 
accomplished during World War II, nor through the utili- O 
zation of the lay-up fleet of private and reserve shipping 
which comprised the bottoms needed for Korea and Vietnam --
these were World War II vintage bottoms and are 
thoroughly worn out.9 
Let us briefly trace the events contributing to the 
decline of u.s. flag shipping over the 1946-1970 period. o · 
9 ' 







Background: The U.S. flag merchant marine industry is a 
victim of lack of foresight, inflation, and crisis 
management: 
In many foreign maritime nations, the merchant marine 
industry is promoted vigorously as a matter of public policy. 
For over one hundred years, Americans have been apathetic 
toward the industry except in times of war. Nevertheless, 
the 1936 Merchant Marine Act, noteworthy in many respects 
for its recognition of a critical situation, was relatively 
inflexible with regard to changing trade patterns, technol-
ogies, and other factors essential to a dynamic merchant 
marine. Operating and construction subsidy assistance was 
extended to the passenger and liner segments of the fleet, 
but not to bulk vessels or oil tankers. The subsidy program 
remained unchanged until 1970 when the act was modified to 
account for burgeoning U.S. petroleum needs. Other liquid 
and dry bulk cargoes had also assumed a greater proportion 
of the world's maritime traffic. The end of the Vietnam 
War signaled a massive retirement, without replacement 
however, of a majority of this nation's bulk carriers, mainly 
old freighters and T-2 tankers. A 1954 stop-gap measure, 
the cargo Preference Law, required that 50% of all U.S. 
government-generated cargo, primarily bulk goods and raw 
materials, should move in U.S. ships. Although many would 
criticize the Act as a failure in later years, it meant 
the difference between not operating and bare survival for 
the U.S. merchant fleet. Most of the older vessels in the 
fleet would have been scrapped otherwise and thus unavaila ~ 
ble for the later traffic needed to support the Vietnam 
effort.10 
Another major problem area resulted from the severe 
post-World War II depression suffered by U.S. shipyards. 
Many yards either curtailed operations in 1946 or closed 
altogether . The primary reason was that both foreign and 
domestic operators had the opportunity to buy u.s. war 
surplus ships. Most major fleets of the world got their 
start through the Ship Sales Act passed in 1946. Conse-
quently, American shipowners felt no pressing need to 
order new shi~s from the yards, and the yards suffered 
accordingly.l 
Simultaneously, with u.s . technical and financial 
support, Germany, Japan, Norway, Italy and others rebuilt 
their shipyards offering the latest improvements. The 
lOibid., p. 184 . 
llibid., pp. 184, 185. 
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combination of their momentum and the inertia of a depressed 
American shipbuilding industry throughout the 1950's and 
l960's led to a major technological coup for foreign ship-
builders. They built vessels in series. Techn i ques of 
assembly line product i on and welding reduced costs and 
launched hulls at a phenomenal rate.12 American shipyards 
did not respond to the revolution so rapidly ••• taking 
an economic beating as a result. 
The 1970 Merchant Marine Act, even at this writing, 
has barely had an opportunity to prove itself. The spectre 
of costs still pervade u.s. shipyard efforts. Fo rme rly, a 
construction subsidy rate of 53% meant that a ship costing 
$23 million in a foreign yard would cost $50 million in an 
American yard. Any u.s. shipowner competing for traffic 
without this subsidy immediately recognized the attractive-
ness of foreign yard construction contracts and registration 
under runaway flags of the PanHonLib variety. The 1970 Act 
subsidy arrangements fortunately reflect a narrowing cost 
differential in domestic vs . foreign shipbuilding -- it is 
currently 35% for 1975. Some shipbuilding awards (for 
liquified natural gas) are s3t for a construction differen-
tial subsidy of only 16.5%.1 
In spite of presently rising foreign costs, however, 
and dollar devaluations, American ships are still more 
expensive because the workers that build them enjoy the 
highest standard of living in the world, as their wages so 
reflect.1 4 What happens when a ship goes into active service? 
At hearings before the House of Representatives Sub-
committee on Merchant Marine in late 1971 , concerni n g a bill 
to amend the Cargo Preference Act, it was demonstrated that 
the most substantial element in the U.S. flag cost differen-
tial, once a ship begins operations, is crew expenses -- a 
function of pay rates and crew size . The operational 
differential subsidy in effect cannot keep up with wage 
inflation. The resulting high cost structure affects U.S. 
0 
o · 
flag operations in two types of cargo categories: open-rated 0 
cargoes (those available for bid, the majority of which are 0 
bulk or non-liner cargoes) and conference-rated cargoes. 
In the case of the former, U.S. operators are unable to bid 







The resulting loss in volume causes a reduction in their 
fleet capacity. Thus new sh i ps will not be built because 
prospective owners cannot secure profitable cargoes. Con-
ference-rated cargoes are a different economic phenomenon. 
Most of the international conferences in which U.S. flag 
vessels operate enable them to secure a reasonable share 
of the market, but because of their comparatively high 
operating costs, again, the ventures are not particularly 
profitable. The effects of international/governmental 
pressures keeping conference rates down and the operations 
of non-conference carriers ("wildcatters") squeeze the U.S. 
operator's profits. He is ther e fore discouraged from 15 assuming the risks associated with building new ships. 
Although costs remain a problem that has yet to be 
solved, one other inhibiting factor is often mentioned by 
observers of the industry as con~ributing to the post war 
decline of the U.S. merchant marine. In a word: divisive-
ness. Instead of pushing for a revived and competitive 
merchant marine, U.S. flag shipping leaders divided their 
limited strength and achieved little. Two prominent 
examples were the lighter-aboard-ship (LASH) and liquified 
natural gas (LNG) programs .•• both developed by U.S. 
operators, but foreign competition capitalized on their 
commercial use first. Container ships (another U.S. inno-
vation) found their use in the most highly capitalized 
commercial shipping operations in world maritime history. 
But it was not until 197.0 and the passage of a new Merchant 
Marine Act that quarrelsome segments of the industry could 
pursue the common goal of restoring the merchant marine to 
a competitive stance.16 
In summary, the post-war anemia of the shipping industry 
can be ascribed to the following: 
1. A nation apathetic toward the merchant marine, 
except in times of crisis. 
0 2. A lasting shipyard depression brought on by an 
o abundance of surplus bottoms after the war. 
3. Shipbuilding and operating costs which are still 
not competitive with the international market, despite the 
offsetting subsidies. 
4. Dissension and lack of incentive in an industry 
which could scarcely afford the consequences. 
15 Ninety-second Congress, Hearings before the Merchant 
Marine Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Committee 
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Part 1, 5 October-7 December 
1971, p. 42. 
16 
Hall,~- cit., p. 185. 
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Discussion: The emphasis centers on getting more deadweight 
tonnage and the cargo to support it: 0 
The 1970 Merchant Marine Act improved upon the 1936 Act 
in five important areasl7: it expands the operating and 
construction differential subsidies sufficiently to stimulate 
the ordering of new U.S. ore and energy carriers to be used 
in the foreign ocean-going trades; u.s. ship operators are o · 
allowed to set up non-taxable profit reserve funds for future 
ship construction; the yearly reduction in the level of 
construction subsidies is gradually driving U.S. shipyards 
to more efficient methods of production; negotiated procure-
ment, in lieu of sealed bids, permits a flexible shipbuilding 
program heretofore not possible; and lastly, under the aegis 
of MARAD, a National Maritime Council has been formed with 
representatives of management, labor, and government joined 
together in a concerted effort to promote public awareness of 
the need for a strong merchant marine. 
Appendix 2 18 displays the U.S. privately-owned fleet of 
ocean merchant ships (1,000 gross dwt. and over) on a growth 
basis at five-year intervals commencing with 1963. It is 
instructive to note the inconsistency in numbers of ships 
and corresponding tonnage. The 1978 estimated figures of 
556 vessels and 20.8 million tons of deadweight tonnage 
represent respectively 15-year low and high marks for the 
industry. Commerce Secretary Frederick B. Dent illustrated 
this phenomenon as an example of "how less can sometimes be 
more. 0 19 If in fact the fleet reaches this goal in 1978, 
we will be significantly cl oser t o the Russians in tonnage 
than originally projected in Section I of this paper for the 
year 1980. 
The earmarks of success for the 1970 Merchant Marine 
Act are proudly exhibited by the Department of Commerce. As 
of l March, 1974, MARAD claimed an under-construction and 
on-order figure of 90 merchant ships with 6.2 million dwt. 
capacity. Only the crash shipbuilding programs of World War 
I and II exceed the current effort. Coincidentally, certain 
non-super power nations stack up as follows in their ship-
building backlog: Japan - 62 million dwt.; Sweden - 11 mill-
ion dwt.; Spain and west Germany - 7.6 million dwt. each.20 
17 Ibid. 
18 Editor, "Maritime Administration," Sea Power, June 








Government "seed" money in the form of construction 
differential subsidies, and matching private industry funds 
of $500 million, have modernized and expanded shipyards to 
the point where they can make substantial inroads into very 
large and ultra-large crude oil carriers, and take on in 
addition the complicated technology of liquified natural gas 
carriers. The latter construction will be undertaken with 
only a minimal subsidy necessary. Five of t~ 1 LNG vessels may be built without any subsidy whatsoever. 
Efforts in obtaining more cargo for the U.S. flag 
fleet have been made manifest by various attempts since 
1970 to amend the 1954 Cargo Preference Act. A sampling: 
H.R. 10694 - A bill to amend the joint resolution 
expressing the sense of the Congress 
with respect to the shipping in United 
States vessels of products purchased 
with loans from the United States in 
order to apply the provisions of such 
joint resolution to other types of 
credit assistance. 
H.R. 10923 - A bill to amend the Cargo Preference 
Law. 
ff.Con.Res. 
403 - Expressing the sense of Congress with 
respect to the application of the 
cargo preference laws to military 
cargoes. 
H.R. 12324 - A bill to amend the Cargo Preference 
Act of 1954 for certain purposes. 
H.R. 8193 - Energy Transportation security Act of 
1974 ( formal title). 
The writer was unable to determine which of several 
0 measures eventually were signed into law. H.R. 8193, however, 
0 received widespread publicity and is a good case to consider 
because of the surrounding controversy. It provided for 20% 
of future U.S. petroleum imports to be carried by U.S. flag 
tankers "at fair and reasonable rates. 11 After 30 June of 
this year, the percentage would be increased to 25%, and by 
30 June, 1977, to 30% providing there is adequate tanker 
capacity. The benefits to be gained from the bill were cited 
to be:22 creation of thousands of new shipbuilding and 
21 Ibid. 
22 . II • d abl . . t. . Prina, L .E., Fair an Reason e Part1.c1.pa ion: Big 
Boost for Merchant Marine," Sea Power, July 1974, p. 29. 
23 
ship-manning jobs; maintenance of a U.S. flag tanker capa-
bility to move petroleum requirements, especially during 
crisis periods; development of a cost-monitoring system 
for petroleum ocean transportation costs, eventually lead-
ing to lower petroleum prices for the consumer; reduction 
of the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit; and protection of 
the off-shore and high seas environment (presumably by 
enforcement of stringent pollution standards). 
Despite passage by both the House and the Senate, 
President Ford vetoed the bill earlier this year. 
Arguments for "protective" cargo carriage legislation 
list also the buttress that many of the world's trading 
and maritime nations enact similar provisions, a fact to 
which I have previously alluded. Witness Representative 
John H. Dent from Pennsylvania ( 1974): 
The Russians just gave us a lesson in interna-
tional etiquette when they bought -- or, rather, 
were given the gift of -- our wheat. The whole 
fight was over whether it was going to be shipped 
in Russian bottoms. When are we going to learn 
one simple thing? Trade of any kind is a 
commercial venture.23 
Neverthless, the fear has often been expressed that we 
invite foreign retaliation by enactment of cargo preference 
laws. Furthermore, because of the inflationary effects of 
shipping in the higher cost base U.S. flag fleet, the 
consumer actually pays more for the product, whether it be 
heating oil or any other common bulk commodity. The Wall 
Street Journal succinctly underscored a third point recent-
ly24: because of the federal government's refusal to allow 
shipments of liquified natural gas in tankers manned by 
foreign crews, large deposits of fuel located in Alaska would 
be shipped to Japan, instead of to fuel-short American 
0 
o -
communities (the Jones Act). No waiver was granted to this O 
law, despite the fact that the United States has no LNG 0 
tankers of its own operating at present. In this situation, 
the U.S. consumer did without altogether. 
23 Ibid., p. 31. 
24 
Landauer, J., "Seafarers Union uses Its Muscle on 
Congress, own Members as Well," The Wall Street Journal, 17 
December 1974, p. 1. 
24 





As the president of the Seafarers Union, Paul Hall, 
recently stated: 
Since 1970, the Merchant Marine Act, the 
National Maritime Council, and other develop-
ments ••• have helped to alter significant-
ly the dismal U.S. maritime outlook. But 
the battle remains far from won.25 
The writer believes that certain additional but less 
publicized steps could be taken to augment the U.S. flag 
fleet's competitive position in world ocean-going traffic: 
1. With respect to increasing cargo through preference 
legislation, it is recommended that either a tax credit or 
tax rebate be given to those importers or exporters who 
voluntarily elect to ship in U.S. bottoms, insofar as these 
domestic companies pay corporation taxes of any sort. This 
move may provoke a negative reaction from international 
maritime conferences and shipowners• associations. It should 
be advertised as a temporary measure intended solely to aid 
an ailing industry which will ultimately become competitive 
in the long run and able to stand the economic rigors of a 
fierce ocean trade rivalry. 
2. we should seek to further bilateral shipping 
agreements when the opportunity affords. In theory, the 
federal government has been against departures from free 
and open shipping competition in the past, other than by tacit 
consent to avoid losing traffic entirely. We already have 
agreements with certain South American countries that some 
80% of trade -- by specific commodity or all trade in general 
-- would be handled by either u.s. flag or Latin American 
vessels. Approximately 20% would be left for third flag 
vessels. As the Latin Americans have attempted to build up 
their merchant marine fleets, we have been virtually forced 
to accept such pools. Why not acknowledge realities and 
extend the practice?26 
3. MARAD has been criticized within the last few 
years or focusing primarily on the design of large bulk 
carriers (such as the LNG and ULCC) and consequently devoting 
25
Hall, ~- cit., p. 186. 
26Ninety-second Congress,~ - cit., p. 46. 
25 
minimal attention to major de ep water terminals capable of 
handling these mammoth vessels. To compete with foreign 
transhipment faci l ities in t he Bahamas and Canada, it was 
proposed that the greater cap i tal c o st of domestic termin-
als would be offset by closer proximity to refineries. 
Hence, lower feeder costs would result.27 Why not, in 
addition, offer tax incentives to private capital sources 
to encourage construction of such terminals, thereby 
accomodating the U.S. tanker fleet projected for the 1980s? 
4. In the short-run, keep operational differential 
subsidy payments on a liberal basis. In the long run, 
attempt to narrow the scope of ODS, much as we have already 
done with construction subsidies. Simultaneously, determine 
the minimum number of seagoing billets required to man a 
modernized fleet, Induce all excess employment above a 
minimum level toward early retirement or severance with 
appropriate monetary incentives.28 
5. For many large foreign flag operators, one 
business is in actuality two businesses: running ships and 
dealing in hardware -- thetrading of ships by purchase or 
in long-term chartering arrangements. The statement has 
even been made that very few of the foreign flag operators 
of dry bulk and tanker vessels would be in the shipping 
business at all if they could not engage in both businesses 
simultaneously. Why should not the United States engage in 
international commerce with our ships as well as cargoes?2 9 
If we can build technologically superior LNG or LASH vessels 
let them attract the risk capital from foreign sources into 
our shipyards. Ignoring construction costs, which are in 
fact becoming competitive, one might object to this idea 
because U.S. taxpayers supported the building of these ships 
through CDS. Yet this is a subsidy to the shipyards and 
should not carry over to a ship's active service. In any 
event, when all CDS is removed in a few years the argument 
will be moot. 
6. Waive the Cabatage provisions of the Jones Act 
until such time as the United States can provide those 
essential transportation services (such as for Alaskan 
liquified natural gas going to "lower-48" destinations) 
which foreign shipping is able to supply. It will not hurt 
our competitive stance appreciably nor slow the progress of 
LNG ship construction. 
27 
U.S. Department of Commerce, MARAD 1972 -- A New Wave 
in American Shipping, 1972, p. 57. 
28 . t d Nine y-secon Congress,~- cit., p. 51. 









7. British and Soviet maritime forces work closely 
in hand with their respective navies, manning logistic 
landing ships, underway replenishment ships, tugs, and 
salvage ships. Privately-owned, civilian manned vessels 
in this country have demonstrated in isolated experiments 
that this type of support to the U.S. Navy is well within 
their capabilities. Thus the Navy would avoid the cost 
of specialized logistic ships in its forces, calling up 
instead a diversified merchant marine fleet of LASH, 
Seabee, RO/RO, and container vessels whenever they were 
needed. The military Sealift Command might also benefit 
by not having to lock into 11charter and build" vessels 
proving less useful in the future and tying up excessive 
capita1.30 
8. Gradually phase out our dependence on the EUSC 
fleet. The doctrine is tenuous and should not await a 
major crisis to prove its unreliability. A multinational 
shipowner's commercial interests lead him to the policy of 
greatest profits, even in wartime. It is doubtful that the 
United States could enforce a claim to most EUSC vessels, 
especially those vessels already plying their regular trade 
routes during an outbreak of hostilities. With an expanded 
U.S. flag merchant fleet covering our fair share of 
ocean-borne trade and serving as a Naval auxiliary, EUSC 
would rapidly become an anachronism. 
some (or all) of these proposals may seem astonishingly 
naive in the face of a complex industrial development 
problem such as the U.S. merchant marine. In the process 
of sub-optimizing I have neglected many large scale influen-
ces which perhaps should have been taken into account. 
Certain suggestions, on the other hand, may have already 
been overtaken by events. 
JOHall, £e.• cit., p. 187. 
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Appendix One 
Tonnage Breakcown of U.S. Flag and EUSC Fleets 
U.S. Flag Fleet (Private) as of June 30, 1968 

















EUSC Fleet as of 16 October 1968 

















Explanatory note: 1968 figures are given because the writer 
was unable to obtain EUSC fleet statistics 
for a later period. The present count of 
U.S. privately-owned vessels is approxima-
tely 600 (see Appendix 2). The figures 
displayed here are intended to illustrate 
proportions and the degree to which the 






0 Appendix Two 
United States Privately OWned Fleet Oceangoing 
Merchant Ships 1,000 Gross Tons and 
over as of December 31, 1974 
·o 
Number of Deadweight 
1963 Ships Tonnage 
Freighters 614 6,782,300 
Bulk Carriers 63 1,080,300 
Tankers 297 6,716,000 
TOTAL 974 14,578,600 
1968 
Freighters 640 7,418,700 
Bulk Carriers so 977,300 
Tankers 277 6,950,200 
TOTAL 967 15,346,200 
1973 
Freighters 329 4,891,700 
Bulk Carriers 26 615 ,ooo 
Tankers 241 8,209,000 
0 TOTAL 596 13,714,700 
0 
1978 ( est.) 
Freighters 291 4,683,000 
Bulk Carriers 33 1,220,000 
Tankers 232 14,936,000 
TOTAL 556 20,839,000 
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Performance In Mathematics Courses 
Factors Influencing Management Student 
By 
B. C. Sonner, R. E. Smith, & J. D. Finnerty 
This study -was aonduated in an attempt to 
determine -whiah variables influence suaaess 
in the three required mathematics courses of 
the Administrative Scienae Curriaulum. Analy-
ses -were performed to relate pertinent explan-
atory variables to grades in each of the 
courses. It was felt that benefits would 
follow if significant relationships could be 
found. 
This paper -was prepared as a direated study 
for LTJG J. D. Finnerty, instruator in the 
Department of Mathematias at the Naval 
Postgraduate Sahool. 
Introduction: 
Students admitted to the eighteen month Administrative 
Sciences Curriculum (hereafter shortened to 'management 
program') at the Naval Postgraduate School ar~ automatically 
enrolled in a series of three mathematics courses during 
their first two quarters of study: (1) MA 2305, Differential 
Calculus, (2) MA 2306, Integral Calculus, and (3) MA 2040, 
Matrix Algebra. These courses are business-oriented and are 
designed to give students the fundamental mathematics 
background necessary for study in economics, statistics, and 
operations research. 
Lieutenants B. C. Sonner and R. E. Smith, U.S. Coast Guard, 
recently reaeived their M.S . degree in Management from the 
Naval Postgraduate School. Lieutenant Junior Grade J. D. 
Finnerty received his undergraduate degree from Williams College 
in l97l and aompleted t-wo years of study at Cambridge University 
in England in l973. He is presently an instructor in the 
Department of Mathematics at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
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Students entering the management program have diverse 
academic backgrounds. Many students have studied mathematics 
and related subjects extensively. Others have little or no 
background in college-level mathematics. 
The student who already has the necessary background 
may attempt to validate the courses through examination, 
or he may decide to remain enrolled and complete the course. 
He must take the initiative. There is presently no effective 
transcript review process to facilitate validation. Instruc-
tors offer students the opportunity to validate during the 
first week of classes, but there is no formal review of 
transcripts to determine which students are qualified for 
validation. As a result, only a small percentage of those 
students who are capable o•f validating ever do so. 
There are several reasons why a student might desire 
not to validate: 
1. Though officers who have been selected for the 
management program are sent a list of recommend-
ed algebra and calculus books suitable ·for self-
study, due to the demands of their present jobs, 
delays in obtaining study materials, and lack 
of a study plan or something to force them to 
study on a regular basis, most students arrive 
at the School unprepared for a validation exam-
ination. As selectees are not made aware of 
validation procedures and prerequisites, few 
are motivated to find the time necessary for 
careful study. 
2. There are few alternative courses available to 
students that early in the curriculum. 
3. Most students are reentering an academic 
environment after several years of military 
duty. The School's academic environment in-
culcates a feeling among students that they 
must attain as high a grade average as possible 
during their first two quarters. The student 
usually feels, therefore, that the mathematics 
courses will provide the needed review, a high 
grade, and an opportunity to readjust to an 
academic routine. 
This situation has a detrimental effect upon both the 
students with and the students without adequate backgrounds 
in mathematics. The student with an adequate background is 
losing the opportunity to take other courses. Once in the 
mathematics courses he becomes the driving force in the 





depth at which the material is covered. The student for 
whom mathematics is new is faced with unfair competition; 
0 he is reluctant to slow the class when he does not under-




Objectives of the Study: 
This research was conducted in an attempt to determine 
which variables influence success in the required mathematics 
courses. Analyses were performed to relate pertinent 
explanatory variables to grades in each of the three mathe-
matics courses. It was felt that benefits would follow if 
significant relationships could be found. Courses could be 
tailored to students' backgrounds. Criteria for placement 
could be established. School procedures could be revised 
to better prepare incoming students and to advise these 
students concerning possible validation well in advance of 
their corning on board. 
Description of the Variables: 
The records of students presently enrol~ed in the 
management program were reviewed to obtain the necessary 
data. The data consisted of infonnation contained in each 
student's college transcript, each student's Graduate Record 
Examination mathematics score, and the grades he received in 
each of the three mathematics courses. Though a larger set 
of observations would have been preferable from a statistical 
standpoint, a complete set of data could be compiled for just 
thirty-seven of the more than one hundred students who have 
studied in the management program since quarter I, AY 73-74, 
when the MA 2040-2305-2306 sequence was introduced into the 
curriculum. 
Thirteen pertinent variables were selected initially. 
Grades from the three courses were the dependent variables. 
The ten possible explanatory variables were: 
1. The number of years (to the nearest quarter) 
between the student's graduation from college 
and his matriculation at NPS. 
2. The number of course-years 1 (to the nearest 
quarter) of mathematics courses the student 
1





had taken prior to his arrival at NPS. 
The number of course-years (to the nearest 
quarter) of mathematics-related courses the 
student had taken previously. These courses 
included advanced economics, physics, engin-
eering and other applied science courses. 
The number of course-years (to the nearest 
quarter) of mathematics courses involving 
calculus and higher mathematics the student 
had taken previously. 
5. A dummy variable taking on the value one if 
the student had taken calculus previously and 
the value zero if he had not. 
6. The student's college grade point average in 
mathematics and mathematics-related courses 
(converted to the NPS 4-point scale). 
7. The student's Graduate Record Examination ( GRE) 
mathematics score (the ending zero was dropped 
for the computer analysis, e.g., 650 became 
65) • 
8. The type of collegiate institution from which 
the student had graduated: (1) Naval Academy, 
(2) Coast Guard Academy, (3) public university, 
(4) private university or (5) Naval Postgraduate 
School (Baccalaureate Curriculum). 
9. The student's overall college grade point average . 
10. The nwnber of years (to the nearest quarter) 
prior to entering NPS since the student had 
last taken a calculus course. 
The SNAP/IEDA statistical computing package was used in 
performing the analyses. One limitation of this package is 
0 
o -
that it allows for only ten variables. Since the information 
required to rate the quality of unde r graduate education each 
student had received was not available, variable 8 was dropped. 
Variable 9 was excluded since variable 6 would provide a more 0 
relevant measure of the student's undergraduate performance. 0 
Since none of the students in the sample had taken a calculus 
course between their graduation from college and their 
arrival at the School, with variable 1 in the model variable 10 
became redundant. So variable 10 was dropped, leaving the 
first seven independent variables listed above as variables 1 
through 7 in the three performance models. Variables 8, 9 and 
10 in the analyses were then the MA 2305, MA 2306, and MA 2040 
grades, respectively. Hereafter the variables will be referred 
to as Xn, where the subscript identifies the variable according 





Three performance models were formulated, one for each 
of the three mathematics courses. 
Model 1: MA 2305 
Model 2: MA 2306 
Model 3: MA 2040 
It was expected that each of the variables x2 through X
1
_7 
would be positively correlated with the dependent variable n 
each model. A larger number of mathematics and mathematics-
related courses taken, greater success in these courses as 
indicated by the student's grade average, and a higher 
aptitude for mathematics as indicated by the student's GRE 
score in mathematics, would each be expected to produce a 
better performance {i.e., a higher grade) in each of the 
three courses. The coefficient of variable x1 , measuring time elapsed between the student's graduation from college 
and his matriculation at NPS, was expected to be negative. 
The greater the elapsed time the more difficult it is to re-
call concepts previously learned and the more difficult it is 
to readjust to an academic environment. 
It was recognized that some of the explanatory variables 
0 would be correlated with one another. Those variables 
0 indicating the number of course-years of mathematics courses 
taken, x2 , the number of course-years of mathematics-related 
courses eaken, X, and the number of course-years of courses 
taken involving 8alculus and higher mathematics, x4 , were expected to be positively correlated. In addition, the 
dummy variable x5 would become redundant if either x2 or x4 were included in the model. It was decided to let tne 
stepwise regression package sort out the relevant explanatory 
variables, and it was anticipated that this would result in 
at least three of the explanatory variables being dropped 
from each model. 
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It should be noted that the three models omit a very 
important factor influencing student performance: the 
attitude of the student towards the management program in 
general and towards the mathematics courses in particular. 
This omission was unavoidable since data were not available. 
It is, however, an important factor which undoubtedly 
affected the final results. In some cases a student who 
had a rather weak background in mathematics and who had 
achieved average grades in college was able to earn an "A" 
in each of the three courses. This was due in large part 
to nonquantifiable factors such as the student's determin-
ation to do well because his performance at NPS would affect 
his career. Leaving these factors out of the models would 
tend to diminish their explanatory power. 
It should also be noted that only one student in the 
sample had ever had a course in matrix algebra. Thus a 
student's previous work in mathematics would be expected to 
have a smaller effect on his MA 2040 grade than on the 
grades he received in the other two courses. Time elapsed 
since graduation and mathematics aptitude would be expected 
to be relatively more important in model 3 than in either 
model 1 or model 2. 
Data Collection: Procedures Used and Difficulties Encountered: 
Data collection involved numerous difficulties. Tran-
scripts differed widely as to (1) course title and designa-
tion, (2) course description, (3) length of academic term, 
and (4) grading scale. Course content also varied. Some 
interpretation was required to translate the information to 
a common base for analysis. 
Establishing values for variables x2 , x3 , x4 and x5 required some assumptions concerning course cont~nt. Since 
time constraints precluded a careful evaluation of each 
college's mathematics courses, a rough comparison was made 
0 
on the basis of course titles. It was assumed that two 0 
semesters were equivalent to three quarters, which were in 0 
turn equivalent to one academic year. It was felt that the 
above assumptions would have only a very small effect on the 
study's findings. 
A second major difficulty encountered was the lack of 
complete information on all students. For some students there 
was no GRE score. Some had not received grades for MA 2306 as 
of the time of the study. Transcripts were unavailable for 
other students. students for whom complete information was 




that all Coast Guard students were excluded from the analyses 
since they lacked GRE scores. While seventy-eight sets of 
records were reviewed initially, complete data were available 
for just thirty-seven students. As long as the thirty-seven 
students in the sample were representative of the entire 
group, these data limitations would not seriously affect the 
overall results. However, the exclusion of a large group 
of students, for example the Coast Guard students, could 
have biased the results. It was felt that the amount of 
bias, if any, was small. 
Data Analysis: 
The statistical properties of the ten variables used in 
the models are listed in the table on page 10. These prop-
erties provide an informative abstract of the background 
and characteristics of the thirty-seven management students 
in the sample. When he entered the program the average 
management student had been out of college 8¼ years, though 
some students had been out as little as 2½ years. Some had 
been out of college as much as 15 years prior to entering 
NPS. 
The students' mathematics backgrounds also varied. The 
average student had taken 2 1/3 course-years of mathematics 
courses as an undergraduate. As many as five course-years 
of mathematics and as little as one-half course-year of 
mathematics were found. The average student had taken 4½ 
course-years of mathematics-related courses, but the range 
extended from zero to 14½ course-years. 
over eighty per cent of the students has taken calculus 
previously, but undergraduate mathematics grades were about 
average (clustered in the c+, B- range). Graduate record 
mathematics examination scores averaged between 620 and 630 
and ranged from 450 to 770. 
C o Grades in the NPS mathematics courses were high and 
clustered. The average grade was in the B+ to A- range 
for all three courses and the three standard deviations 
were small. This lack of variation made it difficult to 
separate out the effects of the different factors influencing 
student performance in the three mathematics courses. 
Regression Results: 
The associations between the variables were examined 




OF THE TEN VARIABLES 
37 OBSERVATIONS 
VARIABLE 1 














(Crs-Yrs of Math-Rltd Crs): 
MEAN 4.457 
STANDARD DEVIATION 3.782 
MEDIAN 4.000 
MINIMUM VALUE 0.000 
MAXIMUM VALUE 14.500 
RANGE 14.500 
VARIABLE 5 























































































MEAN 3 . 451 
STANDARD DEVIATION 0.664 
MEDIAN 3.700 
MINIMUM VALUE 1 . 700 
MAXIMUM VALUE 4 . 000 
RANGE 2.3000 
VARIABLE 10 




















over, they were found to be highly correlated with X. 
As x5 had a higher partial correlation coefficient with each 
of tne dependent variables than did x2 , x3 or x4 , it was decided to adjust for multicollineariEy by excluding x
2
, 
X and X from the regression. After this adjustment no 
sfgnificbt multicollinearity remained in any of the models. 
Also as expected, all the variables except X were 
positively correlated with each of the dependent iariables. 
Of the four explanatory variables employed, X5 was the most 
highly correlated with Xs, while x7 was the most highly 
correlated with X9, and X1 was the most highly correlated 
with X10• Of the three dependent variables X10 showed the 
least correlation with the explanatory variables. 
Stepwise regression was performed employing variables 
X1, X5, X6 and X7 as explanatory variables in each of the 
models. Several different forms for each model, including 
logarithmic and semilogarithmic forms, were tested. It was 
found that the linear model yeilded the best results in each 
case. 
A decision rule was chosen that set the significance 
level at .OS. For each of the three models one-sided tests 
of significance were carried out on the regression coeffic-
ients. An observed t statistic was computed and compared 
against the .OS critical value. To test the significance 
of each model an observed F value was computed for each 
model and compared against F_ 05 • 
First, variable Xs was regressed on variables x1 , Xs, 
X6 and X7. Stepwise regression indicated that only X1 and 
X5 should be included in the model, resulting in the follow-
ing form for model 1: 
Model 1 
Student Performance in MA 2305 
-2 R = .401 x 8 = 3.332 - .076X 1 + .884x 5 
Fobs= 13.05 [3.166) [3.745] 
The observed t value (with 34 degrees of freedom) for each 
regression coefficient appears in brackets beneath the 
coefficient. Each regression coefficient is highly signif-
icant at the .OS level and remains significant even at the 
.005 level. The observed F value is highly significant at 
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the .01 level. The adjusted coe f ficient of multiple corr-
elation R2 for this regression equation indicates that 0 
variation in variables x1 and x5 explains 40.l percent of 
the variation in variable x8 • According to the model a 
student's MA 2305 grade will be on average .076 grade points 
lower for each additional year since the student's graduation 
from college. rt further indicates that there is almost a 
full grade point (.884) difference between the grades earned o · 
by students who have had calculus previously and the grades 
earned by those who have not. 
Model l suggests some guidelines for deciding which 
students should be encouraged to take the MA 2305 validation 
exam. According to the model a student who had previously 
taken a course in calculus and who had entered NPS within 
seven years of his graduation from college would be expected 
to earn a grade not lower than "A-" in MA 2305. The more 
recent the officer's graduation from college, the higher 
would be his expected MA 2305 grade. Especially in view of 
the effect of previous calculus study - or lack of it - on 
the performance of students i n MA 2305, recent college 
graduates whose transcripts list one or more courses in 
calculus should be urged to take t he MA 2305 validation exam. 
Tne only exception would be a student who had received very 
low grades in calculus. A tr an script analysis worksheet for 
computing an incoming student's expected MA 2305 grade is 
contained in the appendix. 
Second, variable Xg was regressed on variables X1, 
X5, X6 and X7. Stepwise regression led to the following 
form for model 2: 
-2 
R = .540 
F = 22.13 obs 
Model 2 
Student Performance in MA 2306 
x9 = .698 + .554XS + .038X 7 
[3.278] [4.750] 
The observed t value (with 34 degrees of freedom) for each 
regression coefficient appears in brackets beneath the 
coefficient. Each regression coefficient is highly signif-
icant at the .05 level and remains significant even at the 
.005 level. The observed F value is highly significant at 
the .Ql level. The adjusted coefficient of multiple correla-
tion R2 equals .540, indicating that variation in variables 








As in MA 2305 whether or not the student has had 
calculus previously is an important factor in determining 
how well he will do in MA 2306, contributing on average 
.554 points to his grade. A one hundred point difference 
in the student's GRE score would mean on average a .38 grade 
point difference (roughly the difference between a B+ and an 
A-). It appears that for MA 2306 mathematics aptitude as 
measured by the GRE in mathematics is the most important 
factor influencing student performance in that course. GRE 
scores alone explained 39.4 percent of the variation in MA 
2306 grades. 
Model 2 suggests some guidelines for deciding which 
students should be encouraged to take the MA 2306 validation 
exam. A student who has previously studied integral calculus 
and who has achieved a score of 72 or higher on the GRE 
mathematics examination should be encouraged to take the MA 
2306 validation exam. At the present time students entering 
NPS are not required to take the GRE in mathematics. It is 
recommended that incoming students be required to take the 
GRE, and that these scores be used for placement purposes. 
A transcript analysis worksheet similar to the one suggested 
for MA 2305 and based on model 2 is contained in the appendix. 
Finally, variable x10 was regressed on variables Xi, 
X5, X6 and X7. Stepwise regression produced the following 
form for model 3: 
-2 
R = .221 
Fobs= 6.11 
Model 3 
Student Performance in MA 2040 
x10 = 2.578 - .061Xl + .023X 7 
[2 . 259] [l.769] 
0 The observed t value (with 34 degrees of freedom) for each 
regression coefficient appears in brackets beneath the 
coefficient. Each regression coefficient is significant at 
the .OS level. The observed F value is barely significant 
at the .01 level. The adjusted coefficient of multiple 
correlation R2 equals .221, indicating that variation in the 
variables X1 and X7 explains 22.1 percent of the variation 
in variable X10- Thus the explanatory power of model 3 is 
weaker than the explanatory power of models 1 and 2. 
Unlike models 1 and 2, whether the student had previous-
ly taken a course in calculus was not an important factor in 
model 3. Since only one student in the sample had previously 
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taken a course in matrix algebra and since calculus and 
matrix algebra requi r e different skills, this result is not 0 
surprising. As wou l d be expected, time away from school, x
1
, 
and general mathema t ics aptitude, X7, provide a better 
indication of how well a student will do in MA 2040. In MA 
2040 students were able to compete on a more equal basis, with 
mathematics aptitude and time elapsed since graduation from 
college affecting student performance to a greater extent in ( -
MA 2040 than in either MA 2305 or MA 2306. 
Since only one st udent in the sample had previously 
taken a matrix algebra course there does not appear to be a 
need for a matrix algebra validation model at the present 
time. Moreover, as neither of the variables in model 3 
directly represents previous training in mathematics, model 
3 would not be useful in deriving a set of validation guide-
lines for MA 2040 should the need arise in the future. 
Within the last few years many colleges have begun to offer 
courses in matrix algebra designed for students not majoring 
in mathematics. Should the number of students entering the 
management program with previous training in matrix algebra 
increase in the future, then the procedures discussed in this 
study should be used to reformulate model 3 and to develop 
validation guidelines for MA 2040. 
Overview of the Results: 
Of the factors considered in this study the three which 
were most important in affecting a student's performance in 
the three required mathematics course were: (1) the number 
of years since the student's graduation from college, ( 2) 
whether or not he had taken a calculus course previously, and 
(3} the student's mathematics aptitude as measured by his 
Graduate Record Examination score. 
While models 1 and 2 are helpful in predicting how well 
a student will do in MA 2305 and MA 2306 and in deriving 0 
guidelines for validation purposes, there are factors other O 
than those which could be considered here that contribute to 
the grades a student receives. Different instructors use 
different grading criteria. The use of quantitative skills 
in duty assignments varies greatly. Motivational factors 
also exert an influence. None of these factors could be 
incorporated in the models due t o lack of data. While the 
omission of these and other factors undoubtedly affected the 
statistical results, it was felt that this effect was small 






The omitted facto .rs together with the clustering in 
the grade distributions, which was discussed in the Data 
Analysis Section, ar~ at least partially responsible for 
the relatively low R values for the three models. The 
variation in R2 values from .221 for model 3 to .540 for 
model 2 reflects the importance of prior course work in 
mathematics in determining how successful management 
students will be in their mathematics courses. In both MA 
2305 and MA 2306 those students who had previously studied 
calculus held a tremendous advantage over their classmates 
who had not. This factor a ccounted for a large portion of 
the variation in final grades, and both model land model 
2 had R2 values significantly higher than the R2 value for 
model 3, in which previous training in mathematics was not 
a significant factor. 
Conclusions and Recommendations: 
The regression results suggest the need for a change 
in the method of assigning management students to mathematics 
courses, as well as other changes which would enable and 
indeed, encourage, the student to make better use of his 
time on board: 
1. Those students capable of validating one or more 
mathematics courses should be identified prior to 
their arrival at NPS. Criteria should include: 
(1) whether the student has had calculus previous-
ly, (2) the number of years since the student's 
graduation from college, and (3) the student's 
Graduate Record Examination mathematics score. 
2. Every prospective management student should be 




Course objectives should be sent to incoming 
students along with recommended study materials. 
The incoming student should be informed as to the 
possibility of validating mathematics courses, and 
he should be given guidelines so that he can 
determine whether he could qualify for validation 
after a reasonable amount of individual study. 
Students in MA 2305 and MA 2306 should be segre-
gated according to whether or not they have taken 
calculus previously. 
5. More individual attention should be paid to each 
student and to his academic background. Each 
student should be advised and placed in courses 




A more individualized and more flexible instruc-
tional approach, like the PSI method of instruction, 
might prove highly beneficial due to the variety 
of backgrounds and abilities of management students. 
More background information should be obtained on 
each student. The content of mathematics courses 
previo u sly taken, job history, and personal objec-
tives should be made known to each student's 
academic advisor. A sample worksheet to aid the 
advisor in transcript analysis is presented in the 
appendix. 
8. Greater effort should be devoted to making students 
aware of the opportunity to validate, to encour-
aging the student to validate, and to developing 
alternate courses so that he will be motivated to 
validate. 
9. Since mathematics courses are preparatory courses 
for later work, a pass/fail grading system should 
be considered. Changing to a pass/fail system 
would ease competitive pressures in the classroom 
and would encourage more able students to validate. 
10. Further study of the factors relevant to academic 
success, and in particular those factors affecting 
student performance in MA 2040, MA 2305 and MA 2306, 
is strongly recommended. This would lead to 











TRANSCRIPT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
MA 2305 
X .884 = ( Calculus: yes = 1, no = 0 ----- -------
(Years since graduation) X(-.076)= -----
3.332 
Expected MA 2305 grade 
Predicted grade of 3.7 or higher (previous calculus course 
plus not more than seven years since graduation) indicates 
that the student should be encouraged to take the MA 2305 
validation exam. 
MA 2306 
(Integral Calculus: yes= 1, no= 0) X .554= 
(GRE score in mathematics*) X .038= ----- ----
• 698 
Expected MA 2306 grade 
*Raw score divided by ten. 
Predicted grade of 3.7 or higher (previous integral calculus 
course plus a GRE score of 72 or higher) indicates that the 
student should be encouraged to take the MA 2306 validation 
exam. 
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All Volunteer Force Management 
By James M. GiZbert 
The author discusses the historicaZ back-
ground leading to the present aii VoZunteer 
Force, some of the probZems that have sur-
faced during the first few years, their 
effect on managers and Zeaders in the 
miZitary, and the effect of the economy 
on the number and caliber of enlistees. 
This p aper was submitted to Professor 
Church for PersonneZ Management and Labor 
ReZations (MN Jl0l). 
Introduction: 
The All Volunteer Force is being hailed by many as 
a complete sucess. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower 
and Reserve Affairs) William K. Brehm told the press on 14 
November 1973 that the Services were only 2 percent below 
p l anned strength at the end of September (6-12). Rear 
Admiral John R. Fisher, CEC, Commander, Construction Battal-
ions, Pacific, in addressing a group of Civil Engineer 
corps officers and wives at a luncheon at the Naval Post-
graduate School in January 1975, made reference to the fact 
that the Seabees were getting the best group of enlistees 
that they had experienced in a long time. Dr. Harry J. 
Gilman, in addressing the MN 3101 class on 3 March 1975, 
0 
o · 
spoke of being a member of the 1969 President's Commission Q 
on an All-Volunteer Armed Force and how proud he was that O 
the resulting recommendations provided for the successful 
All Volunteer Force that we have today. All of these 
persons appear to be fully satisfied that the program is a 
success and it may well be. Numbers can not be disputed 
and an op tim ist would say this meets the criteria for success. 
Chief Warrant Officer James M. GiZbert received his B.S. 
degree from the Naval Postgraduate School in March l975 and 
is presentZy assigned to the Public Works Department, Naval 






For the pessimist, success can't be measured solely by num-
bers. There are some instances where, similar to a golfer's 
score, large numbers are indicative of present and future 
problems, not success. 
This paper will briefly review the historical back-
ground leading to the present All Volunteer Force, some 
of the problems that have surfaced during the first few 
years, their effects on managers and leaders in the military, 
and the effect of the economy on the number and caliber of 
enlistees. It will let you, the reader, decide whether a 
judgement on the success or failure of the system may be 
premature at this time. 
History: 
The All Volunteer Force concept was brought about by 
many separate, yet vaguely associated, events. For years 
the public has been less than enchanted with the conscrip-
tion of its youth. The draft had been in effect since 1940 
and the peopled affected the most had really never experienced 
the absolute freedom of choosing their career without the 
ominous threat of being selected to serve in the armed 
forces at a period of time that may or may not coincide with 
their plans for education or job training. It seemed that 
everything depended upon the drawing of a number and its 
correlation with a birthdate. The threat was not in serving, 
it was only in the selection of the time. Different manners 
of selection were tried, different methods of choosing those 
who would serve and those who could be granted deferments, 
all with negative results as far as quieting the clamor to 
end the draft. Each time this clamor reached major propor-
tions, a military or political situation would surface that 
required military support. The Berlin Airlift, the Korean 
conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and finally the Vietnam 
War all played an important role in justifying the continuance 
of the draft. Strangely enough, the one that placed the 
largest demands on the Selective Service system in recent 
years, Vietnam, also hastened the demise of it. In 1969 the 
majority of the populace of the United States was greatly 
disenchanted with the war in Southeast Asia which had been 
dragging on for over 8 years. Legislators were voicing 
misgivings about our involvement. The cost of lives and money 
was becoming more than the American people were willing to 
bear. The following statement fairly well sums up the public 
opinion during this period of time: 
The dismay of the public was reinforced by the 
embarrassing capture by North Korea of the Pueblo 
spy ship in 1968, the shooting down of a Navy 
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plane in 1969, and the disclosure of military 
scandals, such as deals by Army sergeants major O 
in noncommissioned officers clubs, the alleged 
murder of a Vietnamese double agent by Green 
Beret special forces, and the apparent war 
atrocities committed at the Vietnamese hamlet 
of Song My and elsewhere (7-435). 
President Nixon, in an effort to quiet the unrest in the o · 
country, decided that greater emphasis had to be placed on 
withdrawal from Vietnam. Reduction in the number of personn-
el in the Defense establishment and the ending of the draft 
were subsequently needed. 
A panel composed of 15 prominent members of society, 
among them 2 retired Generals, a Priest, an ex-Secretary 
of Defense, and the rest giants in their own field, was 
appointed by the President in 1969 to study the feasibility 
of and make recommendations concerning the establishment 
of an All-Volunteer Armed Force. The more important areas, 
such as military personnel requirements; supply of personnel 
to the military; historical, political, and Social Research; 
as well as other studies, were investigated and firm 
recommendations made. The military would have to provide 
its personnel with equitable pay, comparab+e living conditions, 
and proper equipment to perform their miss i on in order to 
compete with the private sector for acceptable personnel. 
Last but not least, its members must be presented with real 
job-satisfaction. 
Problems: 
1. To quote General Hackett, British Royal Army, 
What a society gets in its armed services is 
exactly what it asks for, no more, no less. 
What it asks for tends to be a reflection of 
what it is . When a country looks at its 
fighting forces it is looking in a mirror. 
If the mirror is true the face it sees there 
will be its own (2-44). 
The point here being that a regular military force composed 
of all volunteers can not be procured cheaply. If a highly 
trainable force is to be maintained, one that is truly 
suitable for the task required, then the cost must be borne. 
If the cost is slighted or cut drastically, the end result 
will be a nucleus force composed of all volunteers but ill 
prepared to carry out its mission. One of the more important 







or retraining reserve components that may be activated in a 
crisis. In the event of a major crisis, a large influx of 
raw recruits could be inserted as the result of a reinstituted 
draft. It should be explained that there are few scenarios 
for future wars that provide for the entire action to be 
borne by the regular force. In practically every situation 
a mobilization of reserves and/or reinsti~ution of the draft 
is contemplated. High quality, professional military 
personnel must be available to guide the efforts of these 
additional people. Thus, finances can easily become a 
problem. This becomes more paramount as the smell of gun-
smoke and the sounds of explosions become weaker. 
Solution: If the All Volunteer Force is truly a success 
and is to remain a success each and every taxpayer must be 
fully aware of the high cost to maintain such a force. We 
cannot let misinformation or the soothing tones of detente lull 
us to sleep. At the same time, if the necessary funds are 
provided, each and every military person must insure that 
each dollar is utilized to the highest degree of efficiency. 
By proving to the taxpayer that he is represented by excell-
ent managers, money may not become the force that pushes the 
United States from the power pedestal. 
2. The false security that may be inherent in relying 
on numbers alone. In an article in the December 1973 issue 
of The Armed Forces Journal, Secretary of the Army, Howard 
Calloway, presented some glowing facts about the success of 
the All Volunteer Force program. He said that in the past 
few months the Army had recruited some 124,000 young men and 
women and during this period had seen some 34,000 re-enlist-
ments. He further pointed out that, since the end of the 
draft in December 1972, the Army had been able to maintain 
an 84 percent level of its recruiting goals. To quote 
Secretary Calloway, 
We have had a higher percentage of high school 
graduates entering the Army since the draft 
ended - about 10 percent higher - then we had 
in the six months before the end of the draft. 
As a result, we now have an Active Army of over 
794,000 and this is 97 percent of our programmed 
strength. Total accessions, then, have fallen 
somewhat short of our goals, but we are still 
filled far above any level of concern and quality 
is high (6-12). 
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In December 1973 this apparently looked very encouraging. 
However, a story carried in the San Francisco Chronicle on O 
2 December 1974 did not reflect this confidence. The Army, 
in this article, claimed that the All Volunteer Force was 
drawing people to the Army that were not brought by 
"generally love of the country, but the bleak employment 
picture on the civilian job market and the promise of 
learning job-related skills." In this article the Army 
quotes figures concerning new enlistees and their mental o· 
test results. The military uses categories from one to 
five, with one being the quickest witted and five being 
the slowest, to classify the ability and aptitude of their 
personnel. The figures show a marked decline in the 
Category Ones that are enlisting and an even greater decline 
















It should be pointed out that the services are no longer 
accepting Category Five personnel. While the above figures 
reflect that the percentage of Category Ones could be 
approaching a critical level, there seems to be little or 
no concern as we are able to recruit the desired total 
strength. The statistician might say this is proof that 
the system is working. The military manager or long range 
planner may be a little concerned lest the scales become 
tilted toward low quality personnel. 
Solution: Be constantly aware of all outside influences 
that may cause input variables to change. The British, 
who have a lot of experience in a Volunteer Military Force, 
have recognized the effects of the national economy on the 
inputs to the armed services. They say, 0 There is undoubt-
ably a correlation between unemployment and enlistment in 
the fighting services ( 2-45)." This could definitely be a 
factor in the present upsurge in recruiting. If this up-
surge cannot be explained this way, it surely is a direct 
reflection on the private sector in that Category Twos and 









3. Is there a danger that we may end up with a 
service of minorities? In the December 1973 article con-
cerning Secretary Calloway's statements on the success of 
the All Volunteer Force the following figures are found. 
The Marines were successful in recruiting 69 percent of 
their quota, the Navy surpassed their quota by reaching 
101 percent of their goal, and the Air Force topped this 
by achieving 107 percent of their goal. By adding Army 
figures of 84 percent, this averages out to approximately 
90 percent of the combined target figures. Does this 
indicate that all is rosy? Far from it, as pointed out 
in the June 1974 issue of the Armed Forces Journal where 
figures show that Blacks represented 20 percent of the 
total Army strength (up from 14 percent in 1970) and 18 
percent of the Marine Corps ( }Ip from 11 percent in 1970). 
This compares with a 12.4 percent of Blacks in the 17-20 
age group in the general population. It should be remem-
bered that these figures are for Blacks only and do not 
include other minority groups that are represented in the 
military. In June 1973 the Navy had a definite quota for 
the number of Blacks and other minorities to be recruited. 
These were set at 12 percent for Blacks and 6 percent for 
other minorities ( 3-126) . If these figures can be used as 
a guide, we could be looking at an Army composed of 30 
percent minorities and a Marine corps that includes 27 
percent minority members. Personal experience indicates 
that this figure is not unrealistic. Such a fear was 
expressed in the report of the President's Commission. This 
could be an indication that society is not providing ample 
opportunity for the employment of minorities. One must ask, 
if they are not suitable for the private sector, should the 
military be tasked with providing the necessary training and 
experience to better prepare them for societies needs? 
Whatever the cause of the problem, the situation could impose 
a much deeper problem if the a:rmed services were called upon 
to fight a limited engagement. 
Solution: Adopt a set of standards that apply to both 
the military and the civilian sector. If a person cannot 
compete in the private sector, he should not be expected to 
compete in the military sector. If there is to be any 
difference, tilt the scales toward the military. However, 
there is really no need for the military to be so different 
than the society from which its members come. Brigadier 
General J. McKinley Gibson USA ( Ret) said it rather nicely: 
Certainly the military must set high standards. 
It must conduct tough, realistic training. It 
must preach the importance of honesty and integ-
rity, patriotism and loyalty. Officers and men 
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must be physically hard, resolute, self-confident 
and thoroughly knowledgeabl e of the military 
craft. The motto 'Duty, Honor, Country, 1 says it 
all. But having said it, does anyone really 
believe the American Armed Forces can make its 
men much different than the society from which 
they come? Offering them a code to live by, can 
it expect them to have a totally different outlook; 
a different set of values? Would it want to, even 
if it could? (4-18) 
Thus, to task military leaders and managers with the burden 
of training, educating, and reorientation of both the major-
ity and minority races could detract from their main 
mission. once again, to briefly quote General Gibson; 
Certainly, no other group of people in this 
society has a greater stake in fully understand-
ing the current motivations o f the American 
people than do the military. Preparing for the 
day when young American draftees must once again 
be trained and motivated to fight should be upper-
most in the minds of professional soldiers. Is 
it? (4-18) 
Are we guilty of detracting from the quality of the Armed 
Forces when we lower standards to accept certain groups? 
4. Without the draft, can a sufficient number of 
professional people be recruited for the Armed Forces? This 
is one of the problems that has been uppermost in the minds 
of both military and civilian personnel planners. The 
medical profession has created the most concern. There 
can be no substitute in this field. A ship at sea or a unit 
in the field must have ready access to a doctor and there 
are no alternatives. The draft provided the Armed Forces 
with a ready supply of these professionals but this is no 
0 
longer the case. Now that the All Volunteer Force is a 0 
reality there are several different approaches to the Q 
problem • 
Solution: There appears to be no one dominant solution 
to this problem. The different approaches all have merit 
but it will take considerable time to see if they will work in 
the long run. The Navy is constructing a medical facility 
to train people for a career in the Medical profession. 
This facility will not be completed for several years and 
then it will be quite a few years after that before the 






service as medical doctors. This is an expensive operation 
and the cost will continue to rise. As the peace-time years 
continue to increase and the memory of war-time needs 
disappear it will be interesting to see if the public will 
fully support such an operation. The Air Force has an 
extensive recruitment program in operation to procure the 
necessary medical personnel. It is known as the "Fully 
Qualified Physician Recruitment Program" and is designed to 
fill some 600 vacancies. An example of how it works was 
illustrated in an article released by the United Press · and 
carried in The San Francisco Chronicle on 3 March 1975. A 
48 year old general practitioner, who had served as an Army 
rifleman during World War II and as an intern doctor during 
the Korean conflict, was signed to a four year contract with 
a special annual salary of $44,700. His rank is that of a 
colonel. Granted that this is only one case and there may 
not be many recruited at such a high rank, it still illus-
trates the cost that must be borne in order to obtain 
personnel experienced in such a highly professional field. 
In the article it appeared that the pressure of long hours 
and the high cost of living in the private sector played a 
significant role in making up this doctor's mind. In 
explaining why he was accepting a position that brings in 
approximately 45 percent of his present gross salary the 
doctor said, "I'm going to lose some, but I'll be making 
more per hour. My work week has been running 60 to 80 
hours. " Taxes and overhead expenses were consuming about 
50 percent of his civilian income. His wife remarked, "I 
think its fine, we may all have a chance to eat together. 11 
Does this speak well for the society from which he comes? 
An even greater problem that such lateral recruitment and 
placement is apt to bring is the discontent that such high 
financial renumerations may cause among the flag rank 
personnel and the top grade civilians in the public service. 
These dedicated servants, regardless of whether they are 
in the Administrative service, educational service, or the 
Armed Forces are all limited to a top salary of $36,000 per 
year. They too, are highly skilled and perhaps have more 
experience in their field than the doctor that was recruited 
at a higher salary. Will such inequities cause problems in 
the very near future? 
5. Will an upswing in the economy affect the present 
success of the All Volunteer Force? This is the type of 
question that there are many answers to. History of the 
volunteer service in this country would tend to make a 
person believe that the success or failure of recruiting is 
directly tied into the economy. Recruiting was excellent 
during the depression years of the 30's. There were waiting 
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lists for practically all armed services and the selection 
was based on quality and not quantity. The Armed Forces 0 
were rather small in those days as the U.S. had not achieved 
the status of a superpower. However, we had achieved such a 
status in 1973 and recruiting was not meeting its goals. 
There appears to be a definite correlation between Armed 
Force recruiting and the economy. Other factors beside 
financial income affect recruiting. Great interest is O · 
being generated in the medical ranks, for service in the 
military, because of the liberal awards of the high courts 
in malpractice suits. Such variables as these cannot be 
discounted nor should they be relied upon to provide people. 
Solution: There is no apparent solution to this 
problem. It is, and will continue to be, an unpredictable 
factor that must be recognized and dealt with as it arises. 
The overall plan to provide suitable nwnbers of personnel 
to the Armed Forces will have to be viable enough to compen-
sate for such variables. 
Such problems could be listed for several more pages. 
However, the list seems to be long enough to give credence 
to the doubts of those who say it may be too soon to 
acclaim the All Volunteer Force a complete success. The 
apparent success of it has placed many additional burdens 
on the career personnel of the Armed Forces. They must 
relearn some of the basic skills of their trade to cope 
with the new-society oriented people that make up the 
majority of the new enlistees. It will require greater 
managerial expertise and a different type of leadership 
than that which the military is accustomed too. An article 
in The San Francisco Chronicle of 2 December 1974 quoted 
a ten year Army veteran as saying, "I miss the discipline, 
you shout at these guys for two hours, they cry for an hour, 
and then, maybe, they do what you tell them. It ain't like 
the old Army." On the same day in The Barometer, the Naval 
Postgraduate School paper, this saying was printed, "In the 
modern military, the best leaders are born and made -- by 
education, experience, and hard work -- and they have to 
move with the times. 11 Managers and leaders in the military, 
as well as those in the civilian community, have to move 
with the times. Once this attitude is completely accepted 
in the military and such acceptance is reflected throughout 
the adjoining civilian community; then, and only then, if 
recruiting goals are still being met, the supporters can 
claim that the All Volunteer Force is an unqualified success. 
There is no reason why is should not work. After all, we 
were able to support an Army, of sorts, for all by 33 years 
without conscription. But let us not forget that times, like 
leaders, change. During the majority of the years that 
volunteers staffed our forces, we were not the superpower 
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Graduate Education For Military Officers 
By C.R. Schramm 
Recently, graduate education for Military 
Officers has come under heavy scrutinizing 
from Congress as well as the General Account-
ing Offiae. This article disausses the 
validity of these attacks and examines the 
cost of alternative methods of supplying 
individuals with graduate schooling to meet 
military requirements. 
This paper was presented to Professor Fenn 
C. Horton for Managerial Economias, (MN 3Z43). 
Introduction: 
In the past, the general if slightly exaggerated rule 
with regard to training in the military seems to have been 
"more is always better than less." Individuals in the 
military have spent large amounts of time in formal training 
programs, often running as high as 30 to 40 percent of the 
career of some individuals. Once a specific training pro-
gram is in operation, it has seldom been discontinued. Quite 
the contrary, it has usually been expanded or upgraded. New 
training programs spring up and individuals have been pro-
cessed through them with very little consideration of the 
costs. 
Such practices, however, are ending. Perhaps as a 
response to the times - the result of the twin evils of in-
flation and recession - perhaps as a symptom of the growing 
distaste of any aspect of militarism, or perhaps for a reason 
not yet clearly defined, the Congress and other agencies are 
talcing a hard look at military training, and in many cases 
Lieutenant JunioP Grade Carl R. Schramm, U.S. Navy, reaeived 
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drastically reducing the amom1t of funds available to carry 
out existing programs. The merits of such general cutbacks, 
if any, are, by and large, beyond the scope of this paper. 
The focus of attention here is one specific and very costly 
are of military training that has come under particularly 
heavy attacks of late: graduate education for military 
officers. In 1975 over 6800 officers will be paid full 
salaries along with tuition and other expenses while 
attending graduate school. In return they will contract 
to remain in the military for a period of time equal to 
two times the length of schooling, though this varies across 
the services. This graduate schooling program, budgeted 
at over $100 million, has been directly attacked by the 
General Accom1ting Office, "Improvements Needed in Deter-
mining Graduate Education Requirements for Military Officer 
Positions," B-165558, August 28, 1970, by Congress, and is 
an object of study by each of the individual services. 
This paper discusses the validity of these attacks 
and examines the cost of alternative methods of supplying 
individuals with graduate schooling to meet military 
requirements. Examined are different possible decision rules 
for deciding who should be sent to school in terms of 
probabilities of recouping the costs, and second, the cost 
advantages of replacing some or all the programs with 
civilian hirings is examined. 
Methodology: 
The basic decision rule for the investment in training 
by a given firm is simply that the discounted sum of returns 
from a training investment must equal or exceed the dis-
counted sum of the costs (Becker, 1964). For any firm, the 
returns for the investment come from the trainee's marginal 
product being greater than the wages he is paid; the costs 
include all direct payments, such as tuition, plus wages 
O during the training. The decision rule for one year of 
0 training is as follows: (A complete development of this 
rule is found in Gary s. Becker's book Human Capital). 
M-1 




where Wt is the wage in the year t, C the direct training 
cost, MPt the marginal product in year t, r the discount rate, 
m the number of years that trainee will remain employed, W0 
the wage during training, and MP0 the marginal product during 
training. 
One interesting implication of the above rule is that in 
a competitive labor market a firm should never invest in 
general training - training that can be used by other firms -
since the finn cannot pay less than the employee's full 
marginal product without losing him to a competitor. Hence 
the above rule implies that a firm generally should not absorb 
the costs of graduate training by an employee. 
The military organization, however, can hardly be 
described in tenns of the competitive labor market. The 
military structure, most notably the hiring, promotion, and 
retirement procedures alters the above decision rules in very 
significant ways (Hanushek, 1973). 
Entry into the military (with very rare exceptions) 
occurs at only two points: the lowest level of either officer 
or enlisted ranks. Upon entering the military the recruit 
(both officer and enlisted) is committed to remain for a 
minimum period - about four years. Promotion is linked very 
closely to seniority with little variance in any year group. 
Finally the personnel system is strongly influenced by the 
nonvested military program for retirement: if an officer 
serves at least 20 years he can retire at one half his high-
est pay; if he serves less he is entitled to nothing at all. 
Each of these attributes tends to insulate the military 
manpower pool from traditional competitive labor-force 
pressures and, as a result, tends to alter the standard in-
vestment rules (Hanushek, 1973}. 
The military sends officers to both civilian universities 
and its own resident schools for graduate education . While 
0 
o · 
in school, officers are paid full military salary and have no 0 
duties other than attending class. But while graduate o 
education could certainly be described as general training, 
usuable elsewhere, the officer is committed to remain in the 
anned forces for a certain period . Thus competitive pressures 
of the labor market, which under ordinary circumstances would 
not allow for any difference between wage a nd marginal product, 
are eliminated by contract for a period of time. In addition, 
some economists feel that the nonvested retirement system 
allows a divergence of current wage and marginal produc t , 
although not with certainty. Thus a modified decision rule 
for military investment in an individual has been developed 
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where Pt is the probability of retaining an individual in 
period t, I the years of initial service obligation remaining, 
s the remaining years until retirement after training, P' 
the probability that the individual will stay in the service 
until retirement, R the expected present discounted value 
of retirement pay at time of retirement, n the number of 
years of school, and kt= MPt - Wt. 
This equation considers sending an officer to school for 
n years. on the first line are two cost terms: the cost 
during the schooling period and the expected retirement costs. 
On the second line are the certain returns that accrue during 
the commitment period and the expected value of uncertain 
returns which cover the period after committed service and 
before retirement. The military should invest in graduate 
training if the expected value of the last line is greater 
than or equal to the expected value of the first line. 
A significant feature of this equation is its inclusion 
of retirement costs. Recent studies have indicated that for 
many officers a deciding factor in their decision to remain 
in the service until retirement has been their selection to 
postgraduate school. Officers who might otherwise have left 
the service after their initial commitment was up now remain 
to retirement and thereby gain substantial benefits. It seems 
appropriate, therefore, to include some retirement cost as a 
factor in the equation. When one considers the alternative 
of replacing military officers, who might otherwise gone on 
to school, with civilians, there can be little doubt that 
inclusion of retirement costs is appropriate. 
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There are, however, some limitations of the equation 
which should be noted. It has tobe pointed out that there 0 
is the limiting case where the military retains a constant 
number of personnel for the entire force, so that a decrease 
in graduate trained retirees is automatically compensated 
for with an increase in non-graduate trained retirees. In 
such a situation total retirement costs are a fixed cost and 
no retirement term should be included in the equation. A 
0
. 
second limitation of the technique for estimating the returns 
to total investment in postgraduate education is that the 
estimates are only accurate to the extent that the graduate 
and non-graduate degree holders are alike in all respects 
except formal education. National samplings, however, seem 
to indicate that those with PhDs and MAs (military or not) 
are generally brighter (in measured academic performance) 
than those with BAs. The results obtained from the use of 
the above equation are uncorrected for these differences -
if in fact they exist. Any estimates of returns thus are 
biased upward to this extent (Dodge and Stager, 1972). 
However, despite these limitations and others to be 
mentioned later, the above equation remains a handy tool 
for deriving information about graduate education in the 
military. For any group of officers {categorized by such 
criterion as whether or not they receive flight pay, number 
of years in service, whether they are regular or reserve 
officers) all elements of the equation are known except 
the kts. 
The quantity k is usually called the "productivity 
differential" and i~ the amount by which the trained 
officer's marginal product must exceed his current salary in 
each year that he remains in the service in order for the 
training investment to pay off. 
Obviously there are many different values of the 
productivity differential that will satisfy the equation for 
the same Wts and c. Therefore, calculations can be greatly 
simplified if one assumes a constant value for the differ-
ential over time, i.e., k=k1=k2= •.• kt. In other words 
assume the military gets the same "productivity bonus" for 
each year that the individual trained officer is in the 
service. 
This assumption can lead to some criticism since it 
can be argued that a larger differential immediately after 
schooling makes more sense since there is a rapid change of 
knowledge in most disciplines, and knowledge learned today 








argue that increased experience implies a larger bonus over 
time. At present there is insufficient data to verify 
either claim (Dodge and Stager, 1972). 
It seems reasonable to assume, therefore, that the 
differential can be held constant over time. Furthermore, 
with this assumption it is straightforward to calculate 
the constant, or average, differential which must be 
maintained throughout an officer's career in order for the 
investment in his education to be reasonable. 
Comparison of Investments: 
As mentioned earlier, the military is justified in 
sending officers to graduate school if the benefits exceed 
the costs of training. The training costs can only be 
recovered if schooling raises the officer's productivity 
above his salary so that he is paid less than his contri-
bution to the military, or less than his "marginal product." 
While it is often difficult to measure marginal product, 
using the equation shown earlier it is quite possible to 
calculate the increase in annual productivity needed to 
warrant a schooling investment - the productivity differ-
ential (Lindsay, 1972). 
Hanushek has calculated productivity differentials for 
each year of completion of graduate education up to 20 years 
of service; for categories partitioning officers into 
decision groups (regular flying, regular non-flying, reserve 
flying, reserve non-flying); for discount rates of 5 and 
10 percent; and for one, two, and three years of schooling. 
The data used in the calculations were as follows: Wage 
rates were base pay as of July 1970, unadjusted quarters and 
subsistence allowance, estimated tax advantage, estimated 
medical benefits, and estimated benefits from commissary and 
exchange privileges (these estimated benefits are computed 
yearly by the Department of Defense in order to arrive at 
a "true" military wage). costs of graduate education in 
civilian schools, C, were calculated on the basis of $31.70 
per week or $1648.40 per year (these costs are reported on 
Stephen W. Chapel and Robert C. Wilburn, "Cost-Benefit 
Analysis of AFIT Advanced Education," AF/DPXY-70-002 
Directorate of Personnel Planning, HQ USAF, Washington, D.C., 
August 1970). Retention probabilities represent the average 
percentage retained between 1964 and 1967 of individuals with 
advanced degrees in a given year group, regular or reserve, 
flyer or non-flyer. It should be noted that these figures 
probably underestimate the retention probabilities because 
of the depressed civilian labor market that exists today. 
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Retirement costs were calculated assuming average life 
expectancies as figured by the U.S. Bureau of Census (the 0 
same discount rate of 5 or 10 percent was used in retire-
ment pay calculations). Initial service commitment was 
set at four years (Hanushek, 1973). 
Given the above data, annual productivity differ-
entials can be calculated for different classes of officers, 
and comparisons of the differentia l s make it possible to o· 
analyze different decision rules for selecting candidates 
for graduate school. A smaller differential for a given 
length of schooling implies that t he probabil i ty of any 
investment being "good" is larger; tha t is, the probability 
is greater that the schooling investment will increase 
productivity sufficiently to cover costs. This, of course, 
implicitly assumes that the expected increase in marginal 
product from a given amount of education to be the same 
for each age - rank category. An alternate assumption would 
be that lower percentage i ncreases in marginal products 
would indicate higher probabilities of reco up i ng the invest-
ment (Hanushek, 1973). 
utilization of Training: 
The probability of sufficiently increasing product-
ivity thro ugh schooling depends upon the utilizatio n of 
military officers who have been sent to school. It could 
be argued that graduate education, no matter what the field, 
increases the productivity of an individual at any given 
job - say commanding an infantry unit in the Army or 
commandi ng a ship in the Navy. However, it would be absurd 
to carry this argument to the point of sayi ng that an 
individual's marginal product is i n creased by the same 
amount, regardless of the match between job and field of 
specializ a tion. Presumably an individual ' s marginal product 
is raised most effectively when he works in his field of 
specialization (Johnson and Stafford, 1973}. 
The General Accounting Office surveyed a number of 
military installations in 1970 to ascertain the utilization 
rates for officers with advanced degrees. At the 14 
installations visited, 68 percent of such officers were 
assigned to positions that did not call for an advanced 
degree. Further, of the positions that did require advanced 
degrees, only 23 percent were fil l ed by officers with a 
masters degree or higher (General Accounting Office, B-16558, 







The General Accounting Office also found that utili-
zation policies vary by military department. The Army 
determined that an officer could spend up to 37.5 percent 
of his total service time in positions validated as re-
quiring a graduate degree "without harming his career." 
The Navy officer could expect an average of 1.4 two- or 
three-year tours in his specialty. The Air Force tour 
policy calls for more utilization. 
The utilization of officers with advanced degrees 
affects the interpretation of the calculations of product 
differentials. First, the costs of schooling and main-
taining an officer with graduate education were amortized 
over the officer's remaining time in service. Therefore, 
if the officer uses his schooling for only a portion of 
his service, the calculated productivity differentials 
understate the true values. Second, both the stated 
utilization policies of the services, and their actual 
assignment of personnel indicate that utilization is 
likely to be greater at lower years of service, implying 
that young officers are an even better choice for schooling 
than previously suggested. 
Civilian Comparisons: 
The productivity differentials shown earlier repre-
sent the current and future costs of obtaining an officer 
with graduate schooling: the productivity differential 
plus the pay upon leaving school are the "effective salary" 
of an officer at completion of graduate schooling. The 
total annual costs for a newly trained officer must be 
compared to salaries paid to entering and experienced 
civilians with graduate degrees. Presumably, if a civilian 
could be obtained at a cost less than the effective salary 
of a graduate officer, the civilian should be hired and 
one less officer should be sent to graduate school. 
Consider, for example, a non-flying Navy lieutenant 
(0-3) completing two years of graduate training at the end 
of 5 years of service. His pay is $15,434 per year. The 
Defense Department has recently issued a statement saying 
that fringe benefits such as "a free retirement plan, 
government furnished housing, medical and dental care, and 
discount food and merchandise in commissaries and exchanges" 
adds 28.5 percent to military pay. Accepting this to be 
true for a moment, that would bring a lieutenant's pay to 
$19,834. The calculated productivity differential is . 
approximately $4,700. This brings the "effective salary" 
of a lieutenant having just completed graduate school to 
$24,533. The argument then is that if the military could 
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hire a civilian with a graduate degree for a salary (plus 
benefit costs) of less than $24,533 they would be saving 
money. And $24,533 can be considered an understated salary 
figure because in fact the average officer going through 
two years of graduate school has more than 5 years in 
service at the completion of his program. A lieutenant 
commander completing two years of graduate education in 
his tenth year of service has an effective salary of over 
$30,000 per year. 
Using such statistics, and an annual salary of $16,000 
for a civilian federal worker with a masters degree, the 
General Accounting Office has calculated that the Navy will 
incur an additional $50 million in costs for procuring a 
like number of graduate degrees through military programs 
as opposed to civilian hirings. When one considers a figure 
three to four times this amount for the entire armed 
services it quickly becomes a substantial amount of money. 
Yet are such figures entirely accurate? Perhaps not. 
The figures and formulas presented so far and the 
General Accounting Office's reasoning depend to a substan-
tial degree upon "true" military pay as compared to civilian 
pay. This can lead to a serious criticism of the foregoing 
analysis. Namely, the faulty comparison of military and 
civilian pay. 
As mentioned earlier, the Department of Defense (and 
the General Accounting Office) have stated that fringe 
benefits add roughly 25 percent to military pay - about 
10 percent for housing, 3. 5 percent for medical care, 
another three percent for commissary and exchange privil-
eges, 8.3 percent for retirement benefits and 3.7 percent 
because these benefits are not taxed. 
But then it says that its military pay computation 
was based on base pay "plus allowances for quarters and 
meals." 
unmentioned was the fact that not everyone gets 
government furnished quarters - and when they do, the 
quarters allowance is forfeited in return. This makes 
up 10 percent of the 28.5 percent benefits package - and 
it can not be counted both ways, as a part of base pay 
and as a percent of the benefits package. 
Another big item in the benefits picture drawn by 










Anyone familiar with the history of military pay will 
recall that the retirement factor has an "imputed" value 
of 7 percent of base pay - that is, Congress has consist-
ently set military pay scales with 7 percent "withheld" 
because the government paid the costs of the military 
retirement system. 
This, of course, takes it out of the "free" category -
it is a benefit which reduces the amount of take-home pay 
a military person gets, just as the retirement deduction 
taken out of a civil service employee's check - also 7 
percent - reduces his available cash. 
If the military pay figure is increased to account 
for the imputed retirement deduction, then it would be 
only fair to increase civilian average pay to account for 
their noncontributory systems. The trouble is, the 
amount would depend on statistics not available: how many 
such systems there are and how generous the company 
subsidized benefits are. 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to suggest that some 
or all of the military retirement fringe benefit is equal-
ed in the civilian sector by either free coverage, or by 
more generous annuities, or both. 
So there goes another 8.3 percent of the military's 
28.5 percent benefits package. The package is now worth 
only 10.2 percent - 3.5 percent for medical care, 3 for 
commissaries and exchanges and 3.7 for the tax-free nature 
of these benefits. 
Ten percent is pretty good, one might say. But then 
one has to remember that the Defense Department has de-
cided that commissaries must be self supporting so, if 
Congress agrees to that move, it will wipe out a decent 
portion of that 3 percent. 
And there could be some interesting discussions 
concerning medical care. Combat wounds, for example: Is 
treating them to be considered a "fringe II benefit? 
All in all, it looks like there might be only 8 
percent of that big "benefits" package left (Navy Times, 
March 26, 1975). 
The Defense Department has maintained for several 
years that military and civilian salaries are comparable. 
Therefore, the Defense Department goes on to say, because 
of the benefits package, the average military man makes 
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28.5 percent more than his average civilian counterpart. 
we have just seen that figure reduced to 8 percent. 
However, something has apparently been forgotten -
civilian workers get fringe benefits, too. And according 
to a recent study by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, those 
benefits in 1973 - the latest year for which figures are 
available - averaged 35 percent of the average civilian 
wage as computed by the Commerce Department and apparently 
accepted by the Defense Department! 
Yet not one word from the Defense Department even 
hinted that there were such civilian fringes, even though 
the big theme these days is comparability of pay. 
During recent hearings before the senate Armed Services 
Manpower Subcommittee, Senator John c. Culver angrily 
exploded, "Surely security of employment should count for 
something, shouldn't it?" (Navy Times) 
Certainly it should. And surely, on the other side 
of the coin, employment freedom should count for something, 
too. Most civilians can go home to their families every 
night. And if they don't like their boss or their work, 
they have the freedom to shop around for something else to 
do or somewhere else to work. 
Military people can't do these things - and it was 
partially to ease the problems brought on by these restric-
tions that the military fringe benefits were originally 
created. These are the intangibles that can not be put 
into figures and statistics, but they must not be forgotten. 
In light of the foregoing analysis, then, it seems 
reasonable to assume that there is not a great deal of 
difference between the real cost of hiring a civilian with 
a graduate degree or sending a military officer to graduate 
school. At the very least, it is necessary for the General 
Accounting Office to recompute its figures concerning such 
costs. 
It should be noted that despite the above analysis of 
pay comparisons, the decision formula presented earlier 
in this paper for training investments in the military re-











In conclusion, then, what can be said about graduate 
education in the military? First, that the armed services 
are indeed probably spending far too much money on graduate 
training. This could certainly be alleviated by a realistic 
reevaluation of the jobs requiring an advanced degree with 
the goal of eliminating as many as possible. Second, a 
policy of heavier utilization of officers with advanced 
degrees should certainly be adopted. Third, a reevaluation 
should be made of which officers are to be sent to graduate 
school. We have seen that younger officers with fewer years 
service time are much better training investments than 
older officers. 
Other policies are also possible: the military could 
offer a bonus to individuals with graduate degrees if they 
would join the service - much like that presently offered 
to doctors. Or, conceivably, the military could make 
officers pay for a portion of their graduate training. 
One thing seems certain: there will always remain a 
need in the military for graduate trained officers. And, 
considering the present mood of the Congress, it is in the 
best interest of the military to take a hard look at their 
present policies with the view of cutting costs as much as 
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Entropy As A Managerial Concept 
By D. K. WaZZaae 
Thia paper is not aonaerned with the mechanics 
of organizational improvement; it is an attempt 
at understanding an organization as another 
interactive, miarocosmic melieu where peopZe, 
Zike particles, react to coZZisions with one 
another. For background material the writer 
draws heavily on his own training in chemisty 
and physics. 
Thia paper was submitted to Commander McGonigaZ 
for Organizational Behavior and Administration 
(MN 37-25). 
Introduction: 
In Chemistry we are able to predict how substances will 
interact with each other and what new substances will be 
formed. In management science there seems to be a great deal 
of disagreement among researchers about what will result from 
the fnteractive process within the organizational test tube. 
Perhaps if we draw parallels between human systems and phys-
ical systems we can use the so called laws of science to aid 
us in determining the outcome of organizational reactions. 
The second law of thermodynamics is examined herein and 
a comparison made to the entropy of closed physical systems 
and that of closed organizational systems. The terms compet-
ency and efficiency are used frequently in the paper. We say 
that an organization operates competently when it achieves its 
objectives, maintains its internal environment and is able to 
o adapt or retain control over the relevant internal environment 
O over the long run. Effectiveness is measured by how well the 
organization handles these things in any given situation. 
Organizational entropy is measured as an inverse function of 
these attributes. In other words, noticeable entropy has set 
in when the organization begins to fall short of the requirements 
for competence and effectiveness. 
Lieutenant D.K. WaZZace, U.S. Navy received his B.S. degree 
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Entropy for Managers: 
Thermodynamics is the study of the laws which govern 
processes which involve changes in the energy possessed by 
a system by virtue of the motion of the atoms and/or 
molecules within the system. 
There are three laws basic to an understanding of 
thermodynamics: 
1. In a system of constant mass, energy can 
be neither created nor destroyed. 
2. The entropy of a closed system increases 
with time. 
3. The temperature of a body can never reach 
-459.69°F the point where all molecular 
motion ceases. 
We are concerned with the second law and this concept 
named entropy. Initially entropy was a fabrication of 
physical scientists to facilitate calculations and explain 
certain experimental phenomena confronted in the study of 
closed system processes. Unless we intend to perform these 
calculations or derive data from experimentation it is only 
necessary to understand entropy as the degree of disorder of 
the participants in the system. By the second law of thermo-
dynamics we know that the total disorder of an isolated system 
must increase if the system processes are irreversible. One 
depressing aspect of this concept is that if one considers the 
whole universe as a closed isolated system then it is doomed 
to one day unwind itself as all energy is converted from some 
useful form to some useless form and the particles within the 
universe are in a state of complete disorder. 
Suppose we were to view an organization as a closed system 
and postulate that participants interact with one another - if 
0 
o · 
not in the mindless manner of molecules perhaps they are O 
subject to the same laws of interaction. Does not every inter- O 
personal action result in some repondent reaction among those 
effected? Have we not seen once vibrant, exciting organizations 
wind down into a muddle of bland mediocrity or fail altogether? 
Organizational Entropy: 
If we view the lessening of organizational effectiveness 
and competency as the criteria for increasing entropy then in 
what types of organizations are these attributes present and 






a constant level in organizations where problems solved are 
routine in nature, the information required to make decisions 
is minimally threatening to the organizations' participants 
and no internal commitment is required of the decision maker 
or problem solver. In contrast the entropy level will tend 
to rise where problems require innovative solutions, data 
and information required is a threat to the decision partic-
ipants and an internal commitment is required. 
An organizational system can be further dissected into 
levels of participation which display either routine or 
non-routine task performance, varieties of information re-
quirements, and differing levels of commitment. 
The Lower Level World: 
If we look into the lower level work what are its 
characteristics? As typified by the mess decks and to a 
lesser degree as we ascend the pyramid of the lower level we 
find that: 
l. The work is highly specialized and fraction-
alized (Server, Jack-of-the-dust). 
2. It is believed that the simpler the task: 
a. The shorter the training time required. 
b. The more work that can be done . 
c. The greater the ease with which personnel 
can be interchanged. 
d. The greater the satisfaction due to less 
frustration and less responsibility. 
3. Responsibility for planning the work, how to 
do it and what to do lies in the hands of 
managment not ordinarily in the hands of those 
actually producing. 
4. Changes in the lower level world are controlled 
by top and middle management. For example, the 
prescribed length of a man 1 s hair is determined 
by the CNO and this policy is implemented with 
great vigor by top and middle management. 
5. Evaluations of performance, rewards and punish-
ment are in the hands of management. 
The result of this structure are: 
l. For the most part the abilities of the worker 
that are utilized tend to be more of the physical 
variety, muscle power, manual dexterity, etc. 
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2. A high degree of submission an dependence 
toward superiors results because that is where 
the control over his life and world reside. 
3. Because he is told what to do and when to do 
itt the worker tends to take less and less 
responsibility for his own actions. 
4. Behavioral scientists believe that as his 
outward submission and dependence increase, 
his inward response is one of antagonism and 
psychological withdrawal from the organization. 
This inner antagonism is made visible when it 
results in: 
a. Unauthorized absenteeism. 
b. Requests for transfer. 
c. Hostility toward authority. 
d. Gold-bricking and indifference. 
e. Asocial activities. 
Interestingly left to its own devices management's 
response to these symptoms is usually more control, tighter 
regulations clothed at times in the clever disguise of human 
relations programs all of which appear to result in more 
frustration, further internal and external antiorganizational 
a ctivities and self-maintained feedback system of recursive 
di sintegration. 
The growth of control at higher and higher levels has 
even been ins t itutionalized into what we call the systems 
approach were management by definition plans and controls 
human effort and the effectiveness of this effort is monitored 
by exception reports. Unfortunately the life blood of the 
system is information and data and is . therefore susceptable to 
poisoning by distortion of data a nd neutralization of infor-
mation at the lower level. 
The Higher Level World: 
In a pyramidal organizational structure power to change 
the system is vested at the top. There is less contrived 
control and more freedom to innovate than at the lower level. 
The biggest obstacles to constructive change are the inter-
personal relationships and the traditions of the organization. 
The more innovative the manager, the more risks he is expected 
to take in his decision making, the more threatening the 
information he d~als with the higher the probability that his 
actions will violate the traditions of the organization or 








It is at the top that entropy takes its most malignant 
form. Executives, who should be worrying about insuring the 
effectiveness of their subgroup, have assigned themselves 
the task of "getting the job done" thus drawing control and 
attendent responsibility to themselves. 
The elements of position role playing also come into 
play, for example, if a personality conflict is affecting 
intergroup relationships among managers the participants 
are urged not to deal with the conflict by venting their 
emotions. Quite the contrary, anytime interpersonal con-
flicts begin to be voiced at a meeting of managers the old 
edict of "let's leave personalities out of this and get 
back to relevant issues," is erni tted by some well meaning 
conciliator. 
Argyris states: 
"As the interpersonal and emotional aspects of 
behavior become suppressed, we may hypothesize 
that an organizational norm will tend to arise 
that coerces individuals to hide their feelings. 
Their interpersonal difficulties will be sup-
pressed or disguised and brought up as rational, 
technical or intellectual problems. 111 
The fear of violating the traditions of the organization 
have just as dysfunctional as effect if they prevent the flow 
of honest information up and down the organization, if it 
causes executive minds to be closed to new ideas and changes 
in values, if it prevents a manager from taking the risks 
inherent to a vibrant stewardship, or from daring to own 
ideas. The insidious "play it safe" philosophy rears its 
head in this environment and the "safe" individual contributes 
to the peril of the organization dying from within of atrophy. 
Given that a manager falls into the trap of conforming to 
the norms of the organization to the expense of his innovative 
abilities and to the degradation of his charismatic image it 
is understandable why his subordinates will be unable to form 
an internal commitment to the organization thru him. At best, 
all he can inspire is a weak external commitment based upon a 
loyalty inspired by the power of the manager to dispence 
rewards and punishments. 
1
chris Argyris, Intervention and Theory and Method: A 
Behavioral Science View, (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Co., l970}, p. 65. 
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Soon everyone is on the defensive and organizational 
competence and efficiency become lost under the collective 
security blanket. Unfortunately an organization in this 0 
mode soon begins to feel pressures it did not notice before 
because it was full of energy and in motion, now it is winding 
down and sensitive to each intrusion on the daily routine. 
Seemingly, a crisis situation is required to cause 
managers to act like executives again; knocking down social o · 
and interpersonal obstacles, assisting other departments, 
wisely allocating available resources to the correction of 
the problem, encouraging the participation of subordinates, 
venting emotion if task accomplishment is not forthcoming 
in short, acting in the manner which adds vibrancy to the 
organization, substance to his position as leader and 
inserts energy into the organization. 
What of subordinates? They probably see the inconsis-
tency in management's day to day characteristics and its 
demeanor when reacting to crisis and though they too probably 
delight in watching the organization function effectively, 
the constant starting and stopping of the organizational 
machinery soon becomes tiresome and they begin to be apathetic 
about periodic crisis tending to try to insulate their area of 
concern from the ravages of crisis. Once again, reinforcing 
the self-protective mechanism at the labor level that was 
seen to be dibilitating at the management level. 
It would seem obvious that if the organiz a tion functions 
relatively well during a crisis that the level of energy 
expended during crisis management would be appropriate and 
curative as a routine. 
In a physical system since energy can be neither created 
nor destroyed we can see how the reversal of the entropy 
process is impossible, but in an organization surely men with 
a free will can just decide to expend the extra energy required 
to correct organizational ineffectiveness! Unfortunately, men 
of free will are also creatures of habit and the tendency to 0 
informally institutionalize ways of doing tasks without regard 0 
to their relative merit is an all too frequent t e ndency in 
organizations. Hints that this is happening lie in st a tements 
such as: " • •. but that's the way we've always done it" or the 
glib "there's the right way, the wrong way and the Navy way." 
Perhaps lying closer to the inability of the system to 
correct itself is another phenomenon closely related to a 
physical concept -- that of inertia. Inertia is defined in 
classical physics as the tendency of a body to preserve its 





ience shows that organizations and groups of individuals in 
general who have acquiesced to organizational norms are 
quite resistant to change more so than an unaffiliated 
individual. 
To those members of the organization who have traded 
their right to take constructive risks in the organization 
for safe anomality the thought of change invokes fear and 
trembling. 
An ironic aspect of this characteristic resistance to 
change is the manner in which attempts at altering the 
system are implemented. 
The first step, once the change has been formulated 
into a policy, is a compulsive urge for management to hard 
sell the policy to subordinates. The worst mistake being the 
old "that's the way the Admiral wants it, guys" and "I 
don't like it any more than you do, but that's the way its 
going to be." Somewhat more subtle but just as dysfunctional 
is the condensending "you may not see the need for this change 
now, but give it a chance and I'm sure you'll come around." 
Both of these methods presuppose that subordinates will not 
agree with the policy change and give the impression of 
defensiveness on the part of the manager or worse, that the 
manager is passing the buck. Intelligent discussion of the 
policy change precluded by the very atmosphere of its 
presentation and openness in any discussions that do come 
forth is inhibited by the fear that management is uneasy 
about the issue. All of this pushing down from above and 
resistence from below is contributing to the growth rate of 
the entropy level. 
The question arises that if management's methods and 
behavior contribute so heavily to system disorder why don't 
they, as well educated rational men, alter their own behavior 
to be more functional? The answer to this is that self 
evaluation is a rarity in western man and the finding of fault 
in one's self is much more difficult than finding fault in 
others. 
To illustrate this tendency toward managerial blindness 
Argyris reports that: 
11In a study of top executive committees ( who) 
described their relationships with their 
subordinates as good to excellent. When asked 
how they judge their relationship, most of the 
executives responded with such statements as, 
'They do everything that I ask for willingly,' 
75 
and, 'We talk together frequently and openly. ' 112 
The subordinates' view was quite different. Top manage-
ment would have been surprised to learn that in the reported 
study that: 






not know where they stood with their superiors. 
Sixty-five percent did not know what qualities 
led to success in their organizations. 
Eighty-seven percent felt that conflicts were 
very seldom coped with, and that when they 
were the attempts tended to be inadequate. 
Sixty-five percent thought t hat the most 
important unsolved problem of the organization 
was that top management was unable to help them 
overcome the intergroup rivalries, lack of 
cooperation, and poor communications. 
Fifty-nine percent evaluated top management's 
effectiveness as not too good or about average. 
Eighty-two percent wished that the status of 
their functions and jobs could be increased but 
doubted they cojld communicate this openly to 
top management. 
With this natural tendency toward system entropy so much 
a part of organizations, why don't we see them crumbling 
about us with greater frequency? The answer to this lies in 
the fact that there are some attributes of some of the 
participants in the organization which retard entropy and 
indeed can cause it to remain constant. These factors 
include: 
1. The latent talents and abilities of the organ-
izational membership provide a fountain of 
solutions to ineffectiveness when a dire need 
arises. 
2
chris Argyris, Organization and Innovation, (Homewood, 
I l l : Irwin, 1965), pp 61-91. 
3













Some of the members at all levels have a 
high internal commitment to the organization 
which makes up for the lack of contributory 
energy on the part of others. 
Some of the attempts at change are so obvious-
ly necessary that they need not be oversold 
and are easily digestible throughout the 
structure. 
The most powerful catalyst for entropic 
reactions are the flow of threatening data 
in the communication channels, non-routine 
tasks and innovative and risky decision 
making. The vast majority of day to day 
activity deals with fairly routine tasks and 
non-threatening information which have only 
a microscopic influence on system disorder. 
In the Navy we have the benefit of an occasion-
al war to light fires under the participants. 
Petty rules and regulations take a back seat 
to task accomplishment and the human machinery 
miraculously starts to hum again as crisis 
management molds itself into creative, courag-
eous, and innovative management. 
In contrast to the halting of the entropy 
process in war time is the slowing down of the 
process when peace time turns to economic hard 
times and dependence and submission to the 
organization become more internally acceptable 
and inspire a moderate drive to maintain the 
existence of the organization rather than be 
without any organization at all among a majority 
of the participants. 
Conclusion: 
In extending the concept of entropy to organizations it 
is easy to fall into the trap of predicting doom for all 
organizations just as we can predict the ultimate death of 
the universe as it winds down to steady state. The saving 
point is that the concept of entropy depends on having a 
closed system where no new source of energy is allowed to 
reorder the system. Being aware of the entropic forces 
acting within the system and being alert to the symptoms of 
management by crisis, destructive and unresolved intergroup 
and/or interpersonal conflicts and the preference for safe 
decision making and ineffective problem solving should 
trigger a response by management to open the system. Just 
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what is let in to recharge the system is beyond the scope 
of this paper except that good scientific procedure would 
involve a consideration against contamination of the system 0 
during the procedure. 
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